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The Principles and Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM, 2000), generally
referred to as the Standards, delivered the following description of the outcome of
effective mathematics education:
Students are flexible and resourceful problem solvers. Alone or in groups
and with access to technology, they work productively and reflectively, with the
skilled guidance of their teachers. Orally and in writing, students communicate
their ideas and results effectively. They value mathematics and engage actively in
learning it. (NCTM, 2000, p.5)
Although there is general consensus among mathematics educators regarding the vision
offered by the Standards, the implementation of teaching practices and curriculum that
reflect the reform movement has been divisive. Implementation of Standards-based
curricula has been slow and has, at times, been met with significant opposition (Goldin,
1990; Schoenfeld, 2004). “Epistemologically, with its focus on process, the Standards
could be seen as a challenge to the ‘content-oriented’ view of mathematics that
predominated for more than a century” (Schoenfeld, 2004, p. 268).
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Higher education has been sheltered for the most part from the math wars
(Goldin, 2003; Schoenfeld, 2004), but there is a growing interest in implementing
Standards-based curricula in college level courses (Prichard, 1995). Although the focus
of the Standards is K-12 mathematics, the ideals expressed in the vision statement of the
Standards apply equally well to college mathematics. A Standards-based instructional
approach emphasizes conceptual understanding and reasoning which requires a
pedagogical shift from direct instruction to more active engagement including
collaborative work, multiple representations, discussion, and writing (Goldsmith & Mark,
1999). Mathematical literacy rather than skill acquisition is the goal of standards-based
math instruction.
The publication of the Standards launched a research agenda that produced a
number of studies reporting a variety of positive outcomes achieved with a standards-
based curriculum (Riordan & Noyce, 2001). Senk and Thompson (2003) have edited an
extensive review of research on Standards-based curricula implemented at elementary,
middle, and high school levels, reporting that students utilizing standards-based curricula
do as well as students using traditional curricula on standardized achievement tests but,
more importantly, outperformed these students on measures of conceptual understanding
and problem solving.
Interestingly, even in the face of extensive research evidence to support
Standards-based curricula, a surprising number of parents and students resist attempts by
school districts to reform mathematics instruction. Dillon (in McLeod, 1994) conducted
an ethnographic study of elementary school mathematics teaching and found that one
community felt so strongly about traditional computational mathematics that a reform-
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oriented program was nearly terminated. More recently, Lubienski (2004) documented
what happened when an affluent mid-western school district offered parents a choice of a
traditional algebra course or an integrated mathematics curriculum that was reform-
oriented. Of the 600 students enrolled, only 107 (18%) chose the integrated curriculum
while 493 (82%) chose the traditional algebra course. These results are surprising for at
least two reasons. First, the students had experienced a standards-based middle school
mathematics curriculum and second, the majority of parents were college educated with
more than 60% having a graduate degree. Goldin (2003) argues that “the chasm that has
opened is in part attributable to the long fashionableness of certain epistemologies or
theoretical ‘paradigms’ in mathematics education that dismiss or deny the integrity of
fundamental aspects of mathematical and scientific knowledge” (p. 174). The
epistemological differences that have contributed to the “math wars” (Schoenfeld, 2004)
appear to influence parents and students as well as mathematics educators.
Implementation of reform-based curricula in higher education has lagged behind
efforts in public education and research on its effects has produced seemingly
inconsistent results. Hofer (1999) found that students enrolled in a reform-based calculus
course had higher course grades and performed better on common final exam items than
students enrolled in a traditional lecture section although large differences in sample size
and potential differences in quality of instruction may have biased the results. Other
researchers (Norwood, 1994; Windschitl & Andre, 1998) have documented interaction
effects of learner characteristics with type of instruction concluding that a reform-based
curriculum did not produce the desired outcome for some students. Specifically,
Norwood (1994) found no statistically significant achievement differences between
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community college students receiving traditional computation oriented instruction in
developmental mathematics and relational instruction that focused more on conceptual
development and understanding. Interestingly, students with elevated math anxiety
preferred the highly structured learning environment of the traditional sections.
Fleener et al. (2002) studied the effects of a mathematics curriculum for
elementary pre-service teachers designed to provide context and historical perspective for
mathematical concepts. In spite of students’ exposure to this curriculum in a sequence of
courses taken over several semesters, the authors concluded that the curriculum did not
have the desired effect of producing a less technical and more conceptual understanding
of mathematics.
These studies suggest that a student’s ability to benefit from a standards-based
curriculum may be more complex than simply changing the curriculum or instructional
environment. A number of researchers (Berenson et al., 1998; De Corte et al., 2002;
Frank, 1988, 1990; Hofer, 1999; Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Schoenfeld, 1989;
Stodolsky et al., 1991) have shifted their focus to the effects of general epistemological
and math specific beliefs on student engagement, motivation, and achievement. These
two distinct areas of research have recently merged to form what is generally referred to
as the study of domain-specific epistemological beliefs (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002; Muis,
2004)
Early findings from the mathematical beliefs research documented common
perceptions of mathematics held by students. The findings were generally consistent and
indicated that students at all levels of instruction viewed mathematics as the
memorization of a variety of algorithms (De Corte et al. 2002). Doing mathematics
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simply meant being able to access the correct algorithm for the problem (Kloosterman,
2002). A related belief that emerged in these studies, that occurs perhaps as a
consequence of the belief that mathematics is collection of algorithms, is the idea that
problems should be solved quickly. Students tend to believe that if they can not solve a
problem in 5 to 10 minutes, the problem is beyond their range of knowledge or ability
(Frank, 1988; Schoenfeld, 1989). Researchers consistently found it difficult for students
to conceptualize mathematics apart from computation (Frank, 1988; Stodolsky et al.,
1991).
A related area of research that emerged simultaneously was a multi-dimensional
conceptualization of epistemological beliefs (Schommer, 1990) that synthesized previous
research in epistemological development (Perry, 1970; Ryan, 1984), math beliefs
(Schoenfeld, 1989), and goal orientation theory (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Schommer
(1990) was the first to hypothesize epistemological beliefs as a set of more or less
independent dimensions and subsequent research has for the most part utilized similar
dimensions.
Theoretical Framework
Schommer (1990) hypothesized a five dimensional structure of epistemological
beliefs including three dimensions regarding the nature of knowledge and knowing and
two beliefs related to the nature of learning and intelligence. The beliefs about the nature
of knowledge and knowing are based on themes that emerged from developmental
theories of personal epistemology (Baxter Magolda, 2004; King & Kitchener, 2004;
Perry, 1970) and describe a continuum that ranges from a naïve view of knowledge as
6
absolute truth consisting of isolated bits of knowledge that are handed down by authority
to a more sophisticated view that knowledge is tentative and evolving consisting of
interrelated concepts that are constructed. Researchers empirically linked sophisticated
epistemological beliefs with demographic variables like age and level of education
(Chan, 2003; Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993; Schommer, 1998) as well as a number
of desired learner outcomes including higher mastery test scores, text comprehension
(Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992), conceptual understanding (Qian & Alvermann,
1995), meta-cognitive study strategies (Chan, 2003), and GPA (Paulsen & Wells, 1998;
Schommer, 1993a)
Beliefs about the nature of intelligence were derived from research in implicit-
theories of intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 2000). The essence of this
dimension is that people generally hold either a fixed or an incremental view of
intelligence. A person with a fixed view generally takes a deterministic view of
intelligence and would endorse the idea that you have only what you are born with and no
more. The person with a more sophisticated or incremental view believes that
intelligence functions more like a skill that can be improved with effort. Implicit theories
of intelligence have been empirically linked with both demographic variables like age
and gender (Paulsen & Wells, 1998) and academic variables such as reflective judgment
(Bendixen, Dunkle, & Schraw, 1994) and meta-cognitive study strategies (Chan, 2003).
This variable also effectively predicted whether teacher education students held a
traditionalist or constructivist view of the teaching/learning process (Chan & Elliott,
2004a).
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The dimension designed by Schommer (1990) to assess the nature of learning was
based on research in math related beliefs and their influence on learning (Schoenfeld,
1988, 1989) and is generally referred to as the speed of knowledge acquisition. This
belief ranges from a naïve view that learning happens quickly or not at all to a more
sophisticated view that learning is a gradual process that requires continued effort and
persistence. This belief has been linked to a number of positive learner outcomes
including better text analysis, higher scores on mastery tests, and higher GPA
(Schommer, 1990, 1993a).
Previous research in epistemological development had used extensive interviews
as a method of data collection (Baxter Magolda, 2004.; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, &
Tarule, 1986; King & Kitchener, 2004; Perry, 1970) but with the multi-dimensional
theory came the use of Likert-type scales beginning with the Epistemological
Questionnaire (EQ, Schommer, 1990). The EQ was designed to measure five
hypothetical dimensions of epistemological beliefs including beliefs about the stability,
structure, and source of knowledge, the speed of learning, and the ability to learn. The
data from the initial validation studies (Schommer, 1990, 1993, 1998) failed to produce
factors corresponding to all five hypothesized dimensions but a fairly consistent four
factor structure did emerge. Since the development of the Epistemological Questionnaire
(EQ), numerous factor structure studies have been conducted using this instrument or
some variation of the instrument (Braten & Stromso, 2005; Chan & Elliott, 2000;
Clarebout, Elen, Luyten, & Bamps, 2001; Cole, 1996; Jehng et al., 1993; Qian &
Alvermann, 1995; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002; Wood & Kardash, 2002). All of
these studies, utilizing item level factor analysis, have failed to consistently replicate
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either the five-factor hypothesized structure or the four-factor structure supported in the
initial validation study (Schommer, 1990). In addition, coefficient alpha measures of
internal consistency reported in these studies range from .10 to .79 with most in the .50 to
.60 range. One attempt at convergent validity of this construct utilizing two similar
instruments, Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire and the Epistemic Beliefs
Inventory (Schraw et al., 2002), produced similar factor structures but the correlations
between corresponding factors was small enough for the authors to conclude that “it is
unclear what these two instruments measure and the extent to which they measure the
same or unrelated constructs” (Schraw et al., 2002).
Statement of the Problem
In spite of the questionable psychometric properties of popular epistemological
belief scales, researchers have explored the relationship among math related beliefs,
epistemological beliefs, and achievement (Koller, 2001). A survey of college algebra
students (Berenson et al., 1998) revealed significant differences in high and low
achieving students with regard to math related beliefs. Low achieving students were
more likely to have rigid beliefs, viewing mathematics simply as a collection of rules and
procedures. High achieving students had a more flexible view, conceptualizing
mathematics as a reasoning tool where any given procedure was viewed as one of many
possible ways to solve a problem. A study conducted with middle-school students
(Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Hutter, 2005) found that the belief in Quick/Fixed Learning
and the belief that math is useful significantly predicted scores on a mathematical
problem solving task. A student who endorses the belief in Quick/Fixed Learning
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believes that persons are generally born with a fixed quantity of a trait, math ability for
example, and that students who are really good at math learn it quickly and do not have to
work very hard.
The development of mathematics beliefs has also been related to learning
environments (Carter & Norwood, 1997; Frank, 1988; Franke & Carey, 1997;
Schoenfeld, 1988). At the conclusion of a year long observational study in a typical high
school geometry class, Schoenfeld (1988) stated that, “The students developed
perspectives regarding the nature of mathematics that . . . were likely to impede their
acquisition and use of other mathematical knowledge” (p. 145). The student perspectives
documented by Schoenfeld were produced by a learning context where the curriculum
was driven by the text and by state mandated achievement tests. In fact, instructional
effectiveness was measured by performance on a statewide achievement test. As a result,
a number of topics were taught as step-by-step procedures that had to be memorized to
ensure adequate performance on the exam. Mathematical practice consisted of textbook
exercises where speed and efficiency were emphasized. One instructor commented to
students that, “You’ll have to know all your constructions cold so you don’t spend a lot
of time thinking about them” (Schoenfeld, 1988, p. 159).
If beliefs are formed as a result of the structure of instructional contexts, then it is
important for beliefs to be addressed directly in mathematics classrooms, teacher
education programs, and professional development programs. Teachers and students must
be made aware of beliefs that may influence learning outcomes. It follows that in order
for mathematics beliefs to be addressed, they must be assessed. One of the most efficient
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methods of measuring student and/or teacher beliefs is the use of scales that can be
quickly scored and analyzed to provide feedback to students and teachers.
One of the most frequently used instruments to measure student beliefs is a
general measure of epistemological beliefs, the Epistemological Questionnaire
(Schommer, 1990). Math-specific measures that are cited less frequently include the
Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992) and Mathematical
World Views (Koller, 2001) which includes items from instruments developed by
Schommer (1990) and Schoenfeld (1988). The scales listed above have failed to
demonstrate adequate construct validity and all three have failed to produce adequate
internal consistency reliabilities.
One compelling explanation for the weak psychometric performance of these
instruments is an alternative conceptualization of personal epistemology as a collection of
context sensitive cognitive resources, rather than a set of relatively stable,
multidimensional beliefs (Elby & Hammer, 2001; Hammer & Elby, 2002; Louca, Elby,
Hammer, & Kagey, 2004). A number of items on the most popular measures of
epistemological beliefs could elicit either a naïve or sophisticated response from the same
participant based on the context applied to the statement. For example, one statement
from the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) states, “What is true is a matter of opinion.”
(Schraw et al., 2002). Relativistic thinking is generally considered more
epistemologically sophisticated so that strong agreement with this statement would
generate a higher score on the instrument. An epistemologically sophisticated person
could, however, strongly disagree with the statement if interpreted in terms of certain
elements of scientific or historic knowledge like water is made up of molecules
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containing hydrogen and oxygen or millions of Jews perished during the Holocaust. The
point is, a person’s response to this statement cannot be adequately judged as naïve or
sophisticated without understanding the contextual formation of the response.
Examination of the most popular measures of epistemological beliefs including
Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire (Schommer, 1990) and the Epistemic Beliefs
Inventory (Schraw et al., 2002) reveal the use of vague and ambiguous language that,
devoid of context, lends itself to multiple interpretations. This lack of consistency of
interpretation may explain the psychometric inconsistencies across numerous factor
structure studies that have failed to produce Schommer’s hypothesized factor structure or
replicate her results (Braten & Stromso, 2005; Chan & Elliott, 2000; Clarebout et al.,
2001; Cole, 1996; Jehng et al., 1993; Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Schraw et al., 2002;
Wood & Kardash, 2002).
More recently, researchers have begun to focus on domain or discipline specific
epistemological beliefs (Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002; Hofer, 2000; Schommer &
Walker, 1995; Stodolsky et al., 1991) and the results suggest that students’
epistemological beliefs vary by domain. Specifically, researchers have documented
distinct views of knowledge and learning between domains like mathematics and social
studies (Buehl et al., 2002; Stodolsky et al., 1991). Research related to mathematics
beliefs has documented that students generally view mathematics knowledge as static,
believe the goal of problem solving is to produce the right answer, believe that
mathematics knowledge is passively received from a teacher, and believe that
mathematics skill is either something you have or you don’t (Kloosterman, 2002; Lerch,
2004; Mtetwa & Garofalo, 1989; Schoenfeld, 1989). Additionally, mathematics beliefs
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have been shown to influence how learners engage in the problem solving process and
subsequent learner outcomes (Lerch, 2004; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2005). “Often
students’ difficulties with mathematical tasks can be directly attributable to unhealthy
beliefs about the nature of mathematics, school mathematical tasks, and mathematical
behavior and such beliefs are not always readily identified nor are they always readily
overcome” (Mtetwa & Garofalo, 1989, p. 611).
The psychometric inadequacies of the general epistemological belief instruments
currently used in educational studies may be due to a lack of contextual reference for
students to use in responding to statements. Domain specific instruments have simply
inserted a word or phrase regarding a particular field of study into the generic instruments
rather than to provide a richer discipline specific context. The purpose of the current
study was to develop and evaluate a new scale, namely the Epistemological Beliefs
Survey for Mathematics, designed to measure epistemological beliefs specific to the
context of mathematical learning.
Research Questions
The following research questions were addressed in this study:
1. Is the Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics (EBSM) a reliable
and valid measure of mathematics related epistemological beliefs?
2. What is the nature of the relationship between contextualized beliefs as
measured by the EBSM and general epistemological beliefs measured by
the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory?
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3. What is the nature of the relationship between contextualized
epistemological beliefs as measured by the EBSM and achievement goals
as measured by the Achievement Goals Inventory?
4. What is the nature of the relationship between mathematics related
epistemological beliefs as measured by the EBSM and implicit theories of
intelligence as measured by the Theories of Intelligence Scale?
Significance of the Study
It appears that a person’s epistemological orientation influences engagement,
motivation, and academic performance. General epistemological beliefs have been
empirically linked to a number of learner outcomes including study strategy use, text
comprehension, achievement test performance, and GPA. Research also supports the
notion that teachers directly influence the development of epistemological beliefs through
instructional practice, which is influenced by their own epistemological beliefs.
Epistemological beliefs of both students and teachers play a significant role in the
successful implementation of standards-based curriculum in higher education and,
therefore, meaningful measurement of mathematics related epistemological beliefs
should provide an effective tool in implementing the vision of mathematics instruction
provided in the Standards.
In addition, this study addresses issues recently identified as research areas in
need of further study. Specifically, exploration of the relationship of EBSM and EBI
scores and structure were identified as a direction for future research after an extensive
review of literature related to personal epistemology and mathematics (Muis, 2004). The
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EBSM fills a void, in that existing domain specific scales are based solely on general
epistemological belief measures and suffer from similar psychometric inconsistencies.
Existing mathematics beliefs scales have generally not been subjected to psychometric
analysis leading DeCorte et al (2002) to state that “more comprehensive instruments have




In our most mundane encounters with new information and in our
most sophisticated pursuits of knowledge, we are influenced
by the beliefs we hold about knowledge and knowing.
Hofer, 2002, p. 3
Defining characteristics of personal epistemology vary based on the theoretical
orientation of the researcher. The result is a lack of coherence regarding the definition of
personal epistemology as a construct (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The purpose of this
chapter is to explore the theoretical foundations of the construct including developmental,
multidimensional, and integrated models of personal epistemology. Numerous
psychometric studies have been conducted using variations of Schommer’s (1990)
Epistemological Questionnaire. A review of these studies is presented with emphasis on
the psychometric properties, including dimensionality, reliability, and validity, of this
widely used instrument. Studies utilizing domain-specific versions of the instrument are
also reviewed with emphasis on reported psychometric properties. Two parallel lines of
research that have recently been integrated with personal epistemology, implicit theories
of self and domain-specific epistemological beliefs are reviewed. Finally, a definition of
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mathematics related epistemological beliefs is presented and a review of scales developed
to measure mathematics beliefs is presented.
Theories of Personal Epistemology
The following section presents the various theoretical models used to
conceptualize personal epistemology. These include developmental models, cognitive
models, multi-dimensional models, resource models, domain specific models, and finally,
integrated models. Of particular interest were similarities and differences across models
and the historical development of the construct.
Developmental Theories
The foundations of developmental theories of epistemological beliefs are a series
of studies (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Belenky et al., 1986; Perry, 1970) based on
longitudinal and cross-sectional interview data that documented a progression in students
thinking through college and beyond. Although the theorists each use distinct language
to describe the stages of this progression there is a great deal of similarity in the
substance of the stages across models. Generally, these models describe a progression
from an absolutist or received understanding of knowledge to an eventual understanding
of knowledge as contextual and self-constructed.
William Perry’s (1970) seminal work is identified throughout the literature as the
foundation to personal epistemological research. In fact, “nearly all the existing
psychological work on epistemological beliefs and theories can be traced to two
longitudinal studies by Perry” (Hofer, 2000, p. 379). Perry used extensive longitudinal
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interviews with male students at Harvard during the 1950s and 60s to document what he
calls “an intellectual Pilgrim’s Progress”. This developmental progression of qualitative
change in students’ views of knowledge and learning encompasses nine positions which
move from a dualistic or absolutist view of knowledge to a more relativistic view
culminating in commitment, the willingness to adopt a position while understanding that
new information may cause one’s position to change. Perry’s ultimate contribution was
that a student’s view of knowledge better explained student learning experiences and
engagement than motivation, study skills, or ability (Moore, 2002).
As Perry’s ideas were generating interest, a group of women researchers at
Harvard, influenced by Carol Gilligan (1982), asked whether Perry’s model applied
equally well to female samples. Although Perry included female students in his original
samples, his model was developed on transcripts from the male students. Belenky et al.
(1986) used Perry’s model as a frame for analyzing the epistemological beliefs of an
exclusively female sample that included university students as well as lesser educated
social service clients. The result was a developmental stage theory similar to Perry’s in
some respects, but utilized distinct language, as the focus of their interviews was on the
woman’s conception of herself as knower rather than her view of knowledge (Clinchy,
2002). The underlying theme of movement from absolutist to relativistic thinking also
emerges in this model which describes the process in terms of the knower. Belenky et al.
(1986) use terms like received knowing to describe one end of the continuum that
represents knowledge as absolute truth that is dispensed by an authority. The other end of
the continuum is constructed knowing, a position where the knower expresses a
constructivist view of knowledge and understands her involvement in the process.
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Marcia Baxter Magolda (2002), building on the work of both Perry (1970) and
Belenky et al. (1986), sought to explore a “gender-inclusive model of epistemological
development” (p. 91). This theory was based on a longitudinal study beginning with a
gender balanced sample of college freshmen that were followed into adulthood. The
result was the Epistemological Reflection Model, a developmental model similar to those
that preceded it in that the stages represent a general transition from Absolute knowing to
Contextual knowing. Baxter Magolda was able to add to Perry (1970) and Belenky et al.
(1986) in that although gender differences had been suggested after the publication of
Women’s Ways of Knowing, Baxter Magolda was able to more directly explore gender
differences in epistemological reasoning by using a gender balanced sample.
Specifically, she was able to discern that both genders followed the same basic
developmental sequence but found subtle gender differences within early developmental
stages that seem to dissipate as students progress beyond college.
Cognitive Theories
Cognitive theories evolved from the developmental theories previously described
and consequently share a common structure and language. Like developmental theories,
these models describe a sequence of levels or stages that progress from absolutist to
relativistic thinking reflected in responses to questions designed to assess a students
reasoning process when presented with a problem (King & Kitchener, 2002; Kuhn, 2001;
Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). Major differences from previous models include attempts to
validate the developmental sequence by using structured interviews with a standardized
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rating process, incorporating paper-pencil evaluation tools, and focusing exclusively on
cognitive processes.
The Reflective Judgment Model (King & Kitchener, 2002) uses ill-structured
problems, written as opposing viewpoints about a controversial issue (Wood, Kitchener,
& Jensen, 2002) to assess epistemological development. A standard interview protocol is
used to explore how students evaluate the conflicting claims on a given issue. Three
distinct levels, labeled pre-reflective, quasi-reflective, and reflective, have been observed
to describe student reasoning. The three pre-reflective stages are characterized by
thinking that is absolutist. Knowledge is certain and correct answers exist for all
questions. The source of knowledge is authority figures. The two stages of quasi-
reflective thinking are characterized by the recognition of uncertainty and the growing
realization that knowledge is constructed. The student can see different approaches to a
problem or question. Students in the final two stages of reflective thinking are able to
place knowledge in context. They are willing to re-evaluate perspectives as new
information is made available.
Kuhn (1999) has proposed a four-stage theory of epistemological understanding.
Within each of the realist, absolutist, multiplist, or evaluativist stages is a distinct
understanding of assertions, reality, knowledge, and critical thinking. Participants are
evaluated with a standardized interview protocol and assigned to one of the four stages of
reasoning based on their responses to an account of a fictional civil war written from two
perspectives. Typically, students’ reasoning moves from realist, characterized by
inability to distinguish differences between accounts to conceptual evaluativist, where
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differences are attributed to the different perspectives of the writers and
acknowledgement that no true account can be determined.
Multi-dimensional Theories
Schommer’s (1990) multi-dimensional theory of epistemological beliefs
represented a significant shift in epistemological research. Until the publication of her
model, all existing models were represented as developmental sequences with substantial
overlap in structure and language. Schommer’s theory characterized epistemological
beliefs as a set of “more or less” independent dimensions. Initially, her theory consisted
of five epistemological dimensions based on previous research that address the certainty,
structure, and source of knowledge, and the control and speed of knowledge acquisition.
The first of Schommer’s (1990) hypothesized dimensions, certainty of
knowledge, describes a continuum that ranges from a naïve view of knowledge as
absolute truth to a more sophisticated view that knowledge is tentative and evolving. The
foundation for this element of personal epistemology was the observation of
developmental theorists (Baxter Magolda, 2004; King & Kitchener, 2004; Perry, 1970)
that students tended to move from an absolutist to a relativistic understanding of
knowledge as they progressed through higher education.
A second hypothesized dimension is the structure of knowledge which reflects a
continuum ranging from understanding knowledge as isolated bits to an understanding of
knowledge as interrelated concepts (Schommer, 1990). Other theorists (Hofer &
Pintrich, 1997) conceptualize this dimension slightly differently, describing this
continuum ranging from knowledge as a simple collection of discrete, concrete,
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knowable facts progressing to a view of knowledge as integrated, complex, and
contextual. Subsequent research has linked more sophisticated views on this factor with
higher mastery test scores administered after brief learning scenarios (Schommer, Crouse,
& Rhodes, 1992) indicating that students adopting a more sophisticated view approach
learning as more complex than the memorization of facts.
The final dimension acquired from Perry’s (1970) seminal work, is labeled source
of knowledge. This dimension reflects a range of views regarding the role of an authority
figure. The naïve view is the belief that knowledge is external to the learner and thus
knowledge must be obtained from an authority. The more sophisticated view reflects a
constructivist understanding of the learning process as an interactive event with the
learner functioning as an active participant rather than a passive recipient. Interestingly,
this is the only hypothesized dimension that has failed to emerge in factor analytic studies
of Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire (Schommer, 1990; Schraw et al., 2002;
Wood & Kardash, 2002).
The fourth hypothesized dimension, control of knowledge acquisition, was
derived from research in implicit-theories of intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988;
Dweck, 2000). The essence of this dimension is that people generally hold either a fixed
or an incremental view of intelligence leading Schommer (1990) to name this dimension
Innate Ability. A person with a fixed or naïve view of innate ability generally takes a
deterministic view of intelligence and would endorse the idea that you have only what
you are born with and no more. The person with a more sophisticated or incremental
view of innate ability believes that intelligence functions more like a skill that can be
improved with effort.
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A fifth and final dimension, based on research in math related beliefs and their
influence on learning (Schoenfeld, 1988, 1989), is speed of knowledge acquisition. This
belief ranges from the naïve view that learning happens quickly or not at all to the more
sophisticated view that learning is a gradual process that requires continued effort and
persistence. This belief has been linked to a number of positive learner outcomes
including better text analysis, higher scores on mastery tests, and higher GPA
(Schommer, 1990, 1993a).
Prior research on epistemological theories had used qualitative interview
techniques but Schommer (1990) decided to pursue a quantitative factor analytic
approach to construct validity. Shommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) was
constructed and subsequently factor analyzed using two or three item parcels for each
hypothesized dimension. A total of 12 parcels were constructed with each parcel
containing 2 to 11 items. The initial validation was conducted on a sample of 266
community college and university students. No internal consistency reliability estimates
were reported. Principal axis factor analysis yielded four factors with eigenvalues greater
than one and orthogonally rotated to a final solution. The four factors, Innate Ability,
Simple Knowledge, Quick Learning, and Certain Knowledge, aligned with four of the
hypothesized factors although not all parcels produced significant loadings nor did all
parcels load on the theoretical factor they were constructed to represent (a more detailed
critique of this instrument is provided later). In spite of its psychometric inadequacies the
EQ has become the most popular measure of general epistemological beliefs currently in
use.
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Barbara Hofer (2000) produced a similar multi-dimensional theory from an
extensive analysis of existing theories (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Hofer and Pintrich
(1997) first posited a nested theory of epistemological beliefs with both certainty and
simplicity of knowledge contained within a broader core construct labeled nature of
knowledge. A second core construct, nature of knowing, encompasses and additional
two dimensions, source of knowledge and justification for knowing. Definitions of the
first three dimensions correspond with Schommer’s theory. The unique element in
Hofer’s (2000) theory, justification for knowing, references “how individuals evaluate
knowledge claims, including the use of evidence, the use they make of authority and
expertise, and their evaluation of experts” (p. 381).
Hofer (2000) also used quantitative techniques to validate her multidimensional
theory and developed a discipline-focused epistemological beliefs questionnaire. The
items were similar to those included in Schommer’s EQ with the exception that students
were asked to consider a specific academic discipline (psychology or science) as they
responded to items. A four-factor structure, similar to the structure of the EQ, emerged
for both of the 18-item versions of the instrument, although, they varied somewhat from
the hypothesized structure. The four factors were labeled; Certain/Simple Knowledge,
Justification for Knowing: Personal, Source of Knowledge: Authority, and Attainability
of Truth (a more complete psychometric review is provided in a subsequent section).
Hofer concluded that although Certainty and Simplicity merged to form a single factor
and Attainability of Truth emerged unexpectedly, there was sufficient evidence to support
a multi-dimensional theory of epistemology.
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Epistemological Resource Theory
Hammer and Elby (2002) have proposed epistemological resources as an alternate
conceptualization of personal epistemology to both developmental and multi-dimensional
theories. Epistemological resources are defined as “units of cognitive structure at a finer
grain size than stages, beliefs, or theories” (Louca et al., 2004, p. 58). Consider
Schommer’s hypothesized dimension, source of knowledge, which describes a continuum
from understanding knowledge as handed down by authorities to learner constructed.
Elby and Hammer (1999) would posit that it is more likely that a learner can hold both
views simultaneously and engage one or the other depending on context. For example,
an algebra student can quickly understand that an equation is simply a sequence of
invented symbols (knowledge is constructed) yet also rely on teacher provided
procedures for solving an equation (knowledge is handed down from authority). The
same student may rely on instructor provided strategies for solving the equation but
simultaneously believe that understanding will only come with experience in working
problems independently. The complexity of this student’s epistemological framework
could not be assessed with a generic question regarding the role of authority in
transmitting knowledge.
A major contribution of epistemological resource theory is the questioning of
consensus regarding what constitutes sophisticated epistemology. This consensus view,
the term used for a view of knowledge represented across all existing developmental and
multi-dimensional theories and models, proposes that a sophisticated personal
epistemology views knowledge as tentative, evolving, and socially constructed rather
than certain, unchanging, and discovered (Elby & Hammer, 2001). Hammer and Elby
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(2002) propose a distinction between correctness and productivity of beliefs with
attention to the interaction of beliefs and contextual elements. “It is hardly sophisticated,
for example, to consider it ‘tentative’ that the earth is round, that the heart pumps blood,
or that living organisms evolve” (p. 186).
Domain Specific Models
Researchers have also approached this construct as domain or discipline specific
(Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000; Schommer & Walker, 1995; Stodolsky et al., 1991) and
the results of empirical studies support this conceptualization, although, the
methodological approaches used in these studies make comparisons difficult. For
example, Schommer and Walker (1995) used a general measure of epistemological
beliefs, asked participants to keep a particular academic domain in mind as they answered
questions, and concluded that there was no support for substantive differences across
domains after comparing mathematics focused responses to social science responses.
Schommer-Aikins et al. (2003) repeated this study using the same general
epistemological instrument and the Biglan (1973a, 1973b) classification system to refine
the sample selection (Biglan’s model is more thoroughly discussed in a subsequent
section). The study produced similar results and the researchers concluded “that
epistemological beliefs of college undergraduates are moderately domain general” (p.
360). Jehng et al. (1993) however, administered a general measure of epistemological
beliefs and looked at differences in response patterns across academic major. Differences
were found in three of the five epistemological factors measured, leading to the
conclusion that “students who study in soft fields have a stronger tendency to believe that
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knowledge is uncertain, are more reliant on their independent reasoning ability, and have
a stronger feeling that learning is not an orderly process” (p. 31).
Other researchers have developed domain specific measures of epistemological
beliefs (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). Hofer (2000) constructed the Discipline-
Focused Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire to measure the four consensus
dimensions of personal epistemology, certainty, simplicity, and source of knowledge and
justification for knowing. Subsequent factor analysis on both psychology and science
versions of the discipline-focused instruments, produced a four factor structure somewhat
different than the hypothesized structure. The emergent factors were named, Certainty-
Simplicity (contained items from both theoretical dimensions), Justification for Knowing,
Source of Knowledge, and Attainment of Truth. Although the factor structure was
similar across instruments the mean scores were significantly different with the science-
focused instrument producing higher (less sophisticated) mean scores than the
psychology-focused instrument.
Buehl et al. (2002) constructed the Domain-Specific Belief Questionnaire
(DSBQ) based on Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire. Each item was included
twice, once using the word history and one with the word mathematics. Initially a two
factor solution emerged, one primarily consisting of history items and one with math
items. Two subsequent confirmatory studies found improved fit in a four factor model
and this model was adopted for subsequent analysis. Results of multivariate analysis of
variance found significant mean differences by domain. Specifically, students believed
that learning mathematics required more effort than learning history and believed
27
mathematics was integrated with other academic disciplines to a greater extent than
history.
Integrated Models
Recently, perhaps as a result of the lack of a unified conceptualization of personal
epistemology as a construct and inconsistencies across factor structure studies, several
researchers representing various theoretical orientations have proposed integrated models
that consist of dimensional, developmental, and contextual elements. Hofer (2001) first
suggested that “We may be moving toward an integration of ideas from multiple models:
an identifiable set of dimensions of beliefs, organized as theories, progressing in
reasonably predictable directions, activated in context, operating as epistemic cognition”
(p. 377). Since the publication of that statement, a number of integrated models have
been proposed. Multi-dimensional theorists are suggesting that there are developmental
components within various dimensions (Bendixen & Rule, 2004) and developmental
theorists are suggesting that developmental sequences may vary by domain (Clinchy,
2002). In other words, students may function at one level in a humanities context but
function at a different level in a science context. Schommer-Aikins and Easter (2006)
recently examined the relationship between elements of ways of knowing (Belenky et al.,
1986) and epistemological beliefs using two survey instruments. They found
correlational evidence for a relationship between connected and separate knowing and
various dimensions of epistemological beliefs. More detailed analysis is difficult to
interpret due to psychometric inadequacies of the instrument used to measure general
epistemological beliefs.
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Several researchers (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer, 2004; Schommer-Aikins,
2004) now propose that personal epistemology is a function of metacognitive processes.
The major difference in the theories is whether metacognition is viewed as an antecedent
to epistemological beliefs (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer, 2004) or a consequent
(Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Bendixen and Rule (2004) have generated a complex model
that includes both developmental and multidimensional elements with cognitive abilities,
epistemological beliefs, and beliefs change strategies all functioning under a
metacognitive umbrella. Hofer (2004) posits a multidimensional theory of metacognitive
processes that includes metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive judgments and
monitoring. The model places beliefs about the nature of knowledge and beliefs about
the self as a knower within metacognitive knowledge, while beliefs about the nature of
knowing including the source of knowledge and justification for knowing are placed
under metacognitive judgments and monitoring. These theories are similar in that
metacognition is viewed as an antecedent of epistemological belief formation and change.
Schommer-Aikins (2004) has also produced a model that includes reciprocal
relationships among beliefs about knowledge, beliefs about learning, classroom
performance, and self-regulated learning similar to the previous models. Metacognition,
however, is viewed as a category of self-regulated learning which is reciprocally
influenced by epistemological beliefs and academic performance. In other words,
epistemological beliefs exert a direct influence on and are influenced by metacognitive
processes.
Little empirical testing of these models has been completed, but in one series of
studies evaluating epistemic metacognition through student observation, Hofer (2004)
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found evidence for each of the four previously discussed dimensions of personal
epistemology, Simplicity, Certainty, Source of Knowledge and Justification for Knowing.
Student strategies also varied by academic disciple providing support for domain
differences.
Quantitative Measures of Epistemology
Although qualitative methodologies dominated epistemological research in the
1970s and 80s, there were attempts to develop a quantitative measure of personal
epistemology (Perry, 1968; Ryan, 1984). Initially, the goal was to evaluate students’
level of epistemological development on a dualistic – relativistic continuum (Ryan, 1984)
therefore, the first instruments simply measured adherence to dualistic statements. There
have been at least two attempts to transform the Reflective Judgement Interview (RJI)
into a paper pencil-pencil measure (Martin, Silva, Newman, & Thayer, 1994; Wood et
al., 2002), although neither instrument produced results entirely consistent with results
obtained using the standardized interview protocol. It was Schommer’s (1990) alternate
conceptualization of personal epistemology as a multi-dimensional set of beliefs,
however, that initiated a methodological shift toward quantitative measurement of the
construct.
Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ)
The EQ (Schommer, 1990) was based on work by Ryan (1984), Schoenfeld
(1989), and Dweck & Leggett (1988) and was validated in a sequence of studies
(Schommer, 1990, 1993a; Schommer et al., 1992). Schommer (1990) initially wrote 63
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items divided into 12 subsets to measure the five hypothesized dimensions of personal
epistemology, which included structure, certainty, and source of knowledge and the
control and speed of knowledge acquisition. The survey was administered to 263
students, primarily freshmen and sophomores. The results of factor analysis and
orthogonal rotation using the 12 subsets as variables yielded four factors; Simple
Knowledge, Certain Knowledge, Innate Ability, and Quick Learning, each named for the
naïve view of epistemology it represents (see Table 1). The subsets of items that
comprised the hypothesized Omniscient Authority factor produced low loadings across
factors. For example, the sub-set, don’t criticize authority produced loadings ranging
from .26 to .33, and the subset, depend on authority, produced loadings ranging from -.20
to .27. In addition, some of the subsets did not load on the hypothesized factor. For
example, the subset of items, avoid ambiguity, was hypothesized to measure an element
of Certain Knowledge but produced a factor loading of .68 on Simple Knowledge. Two
of the three subsets that were hypothesized to form the Quick Learning factor actually
loaded on the first factor, Innate Ability, and one of these subsets, learn the first time,
actually produced the largest loading (.62) on the Innate Ability factor.
No reliability information was provided but predictive validity was assessed using
a subgroup of the initial sample (n = 86). Students read excerpts of texts from either
psychology or nutrition and were asked to write a concluding paragraph for the passage,
complete a mastery test, and rate their confidence in comprehending the passage.
Multiple regression analysis was performed with background variables entered first
(verbal ability, prior knowledge, and gender) followed by the four epistemological
factors, Innate Ability, Simple Knowledge, Quick Learning, and Certain Knowledge.
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The results indicated that students who expressed a belief in Quick Learning (learning
happens quickly or not at all) tended to write oversimplified conclusions, performed
poorly on the psychology mastery test and expressed overconfidence in their
comprehension of the passage. Certain knowledge and prior knowledge, measured by the
number of classes taken in the field related to the passage, predicted the tendency to write
definitive conclusions. In other words, students with higher (less sophisticated) scores on
Certain Knowledge were more likely to write absolute conclusions while students with
more prior knowledge tended to write more tentative conclusions.
A second study (Schommer et al., 1992) was conducted to further establish the
construct validity of the EQ. The sample for the factor replication study consisted of 412
introductory psychology students. Using the same procedures as the previous study,
principal axis factor analysis followed by the orthogonal rotation of factors with
eigenvalues larger than 1.0, three factors were generated that accounted for 46% of the
total variance. The major structural difference from the first study was the merger of
Innate Ability and Quick Learning into a single factor.
A re-examination of the eigenvalues generated from the factor analysis led to the
decision to force a four-factor solution based on the size of the fourth eigenvalue (.96).
The four factor solution was similar in structure to the initial validation study (see Table
1). Both three-factor and four-factor models were compared using confirmatory factor
analysis and the four-factor model provided a significantly better fit to the data. As a
result, the four factor model was used in subsequent analyses.
A subset of the initial sample (n = 138) participated in a subsequent validation
study. Participants read a passage containing information from an elementary statistics
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text and were asked to evaluate their confidence in understanding the passage. In
addition, students provided information regarding their prior knowledge of mathematics
and statistics, completed a study strategies inventory, and answered questions designed to
evaluate their comprehension of the passages.
Regression analysis revealed that both prior knowledge and Simple Knowledge
produced statistically significant increments in explained variance of comprehension
scores. In other words, the more experience students had with mathematics or statistics
the better they performed on the comprehension test. Additionally, the less they believed
that knowledge is discrete, unambiguous, and handed down by authority, the better they
performed on the test over and above the influence of prior knowledge. Simple
Knowledge also proved to be a significant predictor of overconfidence in text
comprehension. It should be noted that the correlations among prior knowledge and
various epistemological belief dimensions was not reported, but significant correlations
among regression predictors makes judgments about the relative influence of any single
predictor impossible and may have masked the contribution of other epistemological
factors.
A third factor replication study was conducted utilizing a sample of 1182 high
school students (Schommer, 1993a). Minor wording changes were made to the original
instrument written for college samples, based on suggestions from a pilot study.
Principal axis factor analysis yielded a four-factor solution accounting for 53% of the
variance (see Table 1). Internal consistency reliability estimates are reported for the first
time and range from .51 to .78. These reliability estimates, however, were calculated
after students judged to be “in transition” (i.e. students with mid-range raw scores) were
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removed from the sample. A footnote states that the initial reliabilities calculated on the
full sample ranged from .45 to .71. Statistically speaking, removing mid-range scores
from a data set can result in over estimation of variable relationships. It is possible that
mid-range scores were a function of the items rather than the epistemological status of the
students.
Schommer (1993a) conducted a MANOVA using each of the four
epistemological factors as dependent variables with classification (i.e. freshman,
sophomore, junior, or senior) and gender as independent variables to assess
developmental trends in epistemological beliefs. There were significant main effects
reported for both gender and classification. Specifically, girls had more sophisticated
beliefs on both the Fixed Ability and Quick Learning factors. Additionally, there was a
linear trend noted with regard to three epistemological factors. Simple Knowledge,
Quick Learning, and Certain Knowledge scores decreased as students progressed through
high school. In other words, the epistemological beliefs of seniors were more
sophisticated than those of freshmen. Regression analyses indicate that when GPA is
regressed on Fixed Ability, Simple Knowledge, Quick Learning, and Certain Knowledge,
all four epistemological factors made a small but statistically significant contribution to
the prediction of GPA. In a second analysis, GPA was once again regressed the four
epistemological factors after controlling for the effects of general intelligence. The
results were similar in that, all five variables, IQ, Fixed Ability, Simple Knowledge,
Quick Learning, and Certain Knowledge were significant predictors of GPA in the
revised analysis indicating that the three epistemological factors accounted for significant
GPA variance beyond that explained by IQ.
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Using the same sample of high school students, Schommer and Dunnell (1994)
examined the differences in epistemological beliefs between gifted and non-gifted
students. Results of a series of four ANCOVAs, one for each of the four epistemological
factors, and post hoc analyses indicate that “while gifted students change their beliefs in
Simple Knowledge and Quick Learning over the high school years, the non-gifted
students’ beliefs remain stable” (p. 210). Additionally, a gender difference was found for
Quick Learning with boys holding a stronger belief in Quick Learning than girls.
The fourth, and final validation study (Schommer, 1998) was conducted with a
sample of 418 working adults in a diverse range of occupations including, farmers,
lawyers, homemakers, executives, and teachers. The sample was structured so that there
was approximately equal representation with regard to educational experience.
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted using the 12 item parcels previously described
as variables (Schommer, 1990; 1993a; Schommer et al., 1992). The result was a four
factor solution accounting for 53% of the variance and similar in structure to that
described in previous studies (see Table 1). No reliability estimates were reported. The
relationship of epistemological beliefs and two demographic variables (i.e. age and level
of education) were explored using multiple regression. Specifically, each
epistemological factor was regressed on age and education. The only epistemological
factor predicted by age was Fixed Ability with older adults less likely to believe that
ability to learn is innate. Level of education was related to two epistemological factors,
Simple Knowledge and Certain Knowledge. Persons with higher levels of education
were less likely to view knowledge as simple or certain.
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After this initial sequence of validation studies, Schommer’s research utilizing the
EQ no longer employed factor structure analysis. The replication of the four factor
structure across studies led Schommer to advocate the use of factor coefficients
established during the initial validation studies, along with sample specific means and
standard deviations, to compute factor scores for various statistical analyses (Schommer,
1993b; Schommer & Walker, 1995, 1997; Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker, 2003).
This practice seems questionable in light of the observation that four of the twelve item
parcels loaded inconsistently or failed to load (see Table 1) and there has been no
revision of these four parcels.
In the studies described in the following section, researchers have attempted to
replicate the factor structure of the EQ. Two studies document the use of foreign
language translations of the EQ (Chan & Elliott, 2000; Clarebout et al., 2001). Both
studies attempted to replicate Schommer’s findings using translations of the original 63
item instrument and replicating the factor analytic procedures used in the validation
studies including the use of item parcels. Unfortunately, these efforts were not successful
and the analysis of item parcels was ultimately abandoned for item level analysis and
scale revision. Recent criticisms of the EQ (Schraw et al, 2002; Wood & Kardash, 2002)
have focused specifically on the statistical analytic techniques used to explore the factor
structure while supportive of the multidimensional conceptualization of the construct.
Table 1: A Comparison of Construct Validity Studies using the Epistemological Questionnaire with various samples.
Notes: DNL indicates failure to load at > .30 on a factor. Structure coefficients are in parentheses. Innate Ability was changed to Fixed Ability to reflect the
highest loading parcel of items.
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Item Parcel Schommer (1990)
College Students
n = 263









Learn first time Innate Ability (.62) Innate Ability (.44) Fixed Ability (.45) Fixed Ability (.46)
Can’t learn how to learn Innate Ability (.56) Innate Ability (.61) Fixed Ability (.64) Fixed Ability (.85)
Success is unrelated to hard work Innate Ability (.55) Innate Ability (.51) Fixed Ability (.51) Fixed Ability (.38)
Ability to learn in innate Innate Ability (.34) DNL Quick Learning (.49) Simple Knowledge (.33)
Avoid ambiguity Simple Knowledge (.68) Simple Knowledge (.64) Simple Knowledge (.55) Simple Knowledge (.58)
Seek single answers Simple Knowledge (.56) Simple Knowledge (.46) Simple Knowledge (.39) Simple Knowledge (.60)
Avoid integration Simple Knowledge (.54) Simple Knowledge (.43) Simple Knowledge (.41) Simple Knowledge (.52)
Don’t criticize authority Simple Knowledge (.33) Certain Knowledge (..39) Fixed Ability (.40) Quick Learning (.34)
Depend on authority DNL Simple Knowledge (.46) DNL DNL
Learning is quick Quick Learning (.72) Quick Learning (.63) Quick Learning (.51)
Fixed Ability (.45)
Quick Learning (.73)
Knowledge is certain Certain Knowledge (.53) Certain Knowledge (.38) Certain Knowledge (.54) Certain Knowledge (.62)
Concentrated effort is a waste of
time
DNL Innate Ability (.52) Quick Learning (.32) DNL
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Foreign Language Translations of Schommer’s EQ
A Dutch translation of Schommer’s (1990) Epistemological Questionnaire was
administered to 250 sophomore students at three universities in Belgium and the
Netherlands and 414 sophomore students at four different institutions of higher education
in Belgium (Clarebout et al., 2001). Clarebout et al. conducted a series of factor analyses
in an attempt to replicate the factor structure reported by Schommer (1990). In the first
exploratory factor analysis, the same item parcels used by Schommer were analyzed.
The result of this analysis was a four factor solution that explained 55% of the variance
but failed to replicate the factor structure reported by Schommer. The first factor
included the learning is quick and ability to learn is innate subsets. Avoid ambiguity and
depend on authority defined the second factor. The third factor contained the sub-sets,
seek single answers, knowledge is certain, and don’t criticize authority. The fourth factor
did not have any item parcels loading at .50 or above, therefore, no subsets were
identified for this factor. The full results of the factor analysis were not reported. Five of
the item sub-sets proposed by Schommer did not produce a significant factor loading
including, learn first time, can’t learn how to learn, success is unrelated to hard work,
concentrated effort is a waste of time, and avoid integration (see Table 2). Exploratory
factor analysis with the second sample also produced four factors with eigenvalues
greater than one and explained 50% of the total variance yet only three sub-sets produced
factor loadings of .50 or higher. Clarebout et al. (2001) reports that avoid integration
and avoid ambiguity defined the first factor while knowledge is certain defined factor
three. A full comparison of the factor structure reported in Shommer’s (1990) initial
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validation study and both of the analyses reported by Clarebout et al. are reported in
Table 2.
A second exploratory factor analysis was conducted using the items rather than
sub-sets as variables. For the data from the first sample, a principal components analysis
identified two factors with eigenvalues larger than one. These two components
accounted for 15% of the variance. Following varimax rotation of the two factors, items
were removed that had factor loadings less than .40. The result was one factor named,
For Most, Intelligence is Factual Knowledge, consisting of 8 items and internal
consistency reliability equal to .68. The second factor, Scientists Know the Truth,
contained 2 items, and produced a reliability estimate of .71.
Similar procedures were used to analyze data from a second sample. Principal
components analysis resulted in four factors with eigenvalues greater than one that
accounted for 21% of the variance. An iterative process was used to obtain a final
solution that involved removing items that had a factor loading less than .40 and then
reanalyzing the data. The final result was a three factor solution, each made up of two
items. The factors were named, Scientists Know the Truth, Meaning is Contextually
Constructed, and Effort Pays. The scales produced internal reliability coefficients of .59,
.53 and .31 respectively. These disappointing results led Clarebout et al. (2001) to
conclude that, “the failure in two subsequent studies both to replicate factor structures
similar to the ones reported by Schommer and to construct reliable scales . . . puts further
into question the usability of the instrument in research on epistemological beliefs” (p.
74).
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Chan and Elliott (2000, 2002) conducted a series of studies to replicate the factor
structure of Schommer’s (1990) Epistemological Questionnaire with students at the Hong
Kong Institute of Education using both the English version and a Chinese translation.
Initially they used Schommer’s 63 item instrument grouping the items into 12 subscales
as Schommer had done in her original study. Exploratory factor analysis failed to
replicate Schommer’s factor structure (see Table 2). Chan and Elliott (2000) reported a
three factor solution accounting for 46.5% of the variance. The authors explored a four
factor solution but four factors did not improve interpretability of the factors. Only eight
of the 12 subscales produced factor loadings of .40 or larger. The remaining four
subscales produced factor loadings between .31 and .35. One interesting difference
between Schommer’s validation studies and the results reported by Chan and Elliott was
the performance of the parcel, don’t criticize authority that produced a loading of .80 in
the Hong Kong sample.
These results, along with internal consistency reliability analysis on the 12
subscales that produced Cronbach alpha estimates ranging from .10 to .58, led Chan and
Elliott (2002) to pursue a revision of Schommer’s instrument. Utilizing an iterative
process and feedback from students and faculty, they developed a 45 item instrument that
was later reduced to 30 items based on results from both exploratory and confirmatory
factor analyses. The 30-item instrument produced four factors with internal consistency
reliability estimates ranging from .60 to .70 (Chan & Elliott, 2002). CFA analysis
provided support for the four factor structure as GFI, AGFI, and RMSEA were all with
acceptable limits for good fit. The following represents a brief description of each factor.
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• Innate/Fixed Ability (alpha = .64) – measures the extent to which one believes
ability to learn is fixed at birth or improvable.
• Learning Effort/Process (alpha = .77) – measures the extent to which one agrees
that wisdom is a process and hard work and persistence are key to success
• Authority/Expert Knowledge (alpha = .52) – measures the extent to which one
questions authority sources.
• Certainty Knowledge (alpha = .53) – measures the extent to which one agrees
that scientists can ultimately find the truth.
In an attempt to provide depth to the understanding of this construct and potential
cultural differences between North American students and Chinese students a qualitative
component was included in the research design. As a result of the analysis of interview
data, Chan and Elliott (2002) concluded that some of the responses were “at times
inconsistent and occasionally contradictory” (p. 404). The interview data seemed to
suggest that contradictory responses may have been due, in part, to domain and
contextual differences.
Additional validation studies (Chan, 2003; Chan & Elliott, 2004a) with the
revised 30 item Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (EBQ) were conducted with
samples of Hong Kong teacher education students similar to participants in the previous
studies. No factor analytic results were reported but internal consistency reliability
estimates ranged from .52 to .77 on the four factors. More recently, Chan and Elliot
(2004b) have proposed a hierarchical factor structure to represent the nature of
epistemological beliefs. The structure describes epistemological beliefs initially divided
into two categories, beliefs about knowledge and beliefs about knowing. Beliefs about
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knowledge are then further divided into two beliefs pertaining to the structure of
knowledge, Simple/Complex and Certain/Tentative. Beliefs about knowing are further
divided in three factors, the source of knowing, speed of knowing and ability. These
factors are labeled Authority/Justification, Effort/Process, and Innate/Acquired. This
hierarchical structure has not been empirically tested but provides an interesting
hypothesis that explains inconsistent factor structure.
Although Schommer (Duell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001) reported a consistent
four-factor structure across studies, the studies just described failed to replicate this
structure with international samples. Researchers (Clarebout et al., 2001; Chan & Elliott,
2002) ultimately abandoned analysis using item parcels and conducted item level factor
analysis. The results in both cases were disappointing leading Clarebout et al. (2001) to
abandon use of the instrument while Chan and Elliott (2002) revised poorly performing
items and generated a more psychometrically sound scale for subsequent research. Table
2 presents a full comparison of factor results across studies.
Table 2: A comparison of factor structures across studies using item parcels as variables
Item Parcel Schommer (1990) Chan & Elliot (2000)
Clarebout et al. (2001)
Sample 1
Clarebout et al. (2001)
Sample 2
Learn first time Innate Ability (.62) Fixed/Innate Ability (.41) DNL DNL
Can’t learn how to learn Innate Ability (.56) Fixed/Innate Ability (.69) DNL DNL
Success is unrelated to hard work Innate Ability (.55) Fixed/Innate Ability (.61) DNL DNL
Ability to learn in innate Innate Ability (.34) Certain Knowledge (.61) Quick Learning (.54) DNL
Avoid ambiguity Simple Knowledge (.68) Certain Knowledge (.48) Simple Knowledge (.59) Simple Knowledge (.56)
Seek single answers Simple Knowledge (.56) Certain Knowledge (.35) Certain Knowledge (.51) DNL
Avoid integration Simple Knowledge (.54) Fixed/Innate Ability (.35) DNL Simple Knowledge (.53)
Don’t criticize authority Simple Knowledge (.33) Omniscient Authority (.80) Certain Knowledge (.55) DNL
Depend on authority DNL Certain Knowledge (.31) Simple Knowledge (.50) DNL
Learning is quick Quick Learning (.72) Omniscient Authority (.40) Quick Learning (.52) DNL
Knowledge is certain Certain Knowledge (.53) Omniscient Authority (.43) Certain Knowledge (.51) Certain Knowledge (.79)
Concentrated effort is a waste of
time
DNL Fixed/Innate Ability (.32) DNL DNL
Notes: All four studies used Varimax rotation for factor interpretation. Reported factor loadings are in parentheses. DNL indicates failure to load at >.30 on
a factor for Schommer and >.50 for Clarebout et al.
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Revised Eptistemological Belief Questionnaire
A revised version of Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire was
administered to 212 high school science students (Qian & Alvermann, 1995). Qian and
Alverman eliminated the10 items that were hypothesized to load on the Omniscient
Authority factor but had failed to produce a distinct factor in previous research. The
revised 53 item Epistemological Belief Questionnaire was subjected to exploratory factor
analysis to assess dimensionality. One distinct procedural difference from previous
research with the EQ was that the items rather than item parcels were subjected to factor
analysis (Schommer ,1990; Schommer et al., 1992). Thirty-two items produced factor
loadings greater than .30. The remaining 21 items were deleted from subsequent
analyses and the instrument was renamed the Revised Epistemological Belief
Questionnaire.
The revised instrument was re-analyzed using exploratory factor analysis and two,
three, four, and five factor solutions were compared. The three factor solution proved to
produce the strongest statistical and theoretical fit to the data and was therefore used in
subsequent analyses. The three factors were identified as Learning is Quick, consisting
of 15 items with internal consistency reliability equal to .79; Knowledge is Simple and
Certain containing 11 items with coefficient alpha equal to .68; and Ability to Learn is
Innate containing 6 items with alpha equal to .62. The overall alpha for the full 32 item
scale was .77. The authors conclude that “the modest internal consistency may be due to
the nonconsensuality of the construct underlying belief systems. The nonconsensuality
may suggest that the construct of underlying epistemological beliefs does not lend itself
easily to empirical research” (Qian & Alverman, 1995, p. 290). In other words, students
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may respond inconsistently to items because of the generic nature of the items or perhaps
the lack of contextual structure makes it difficult to respond consistently to intra-
dimensional items.
The validity of the scale was assessed using a variety of statistical analyses to
explore the relationship among epistemological belief variables, learned helplessness, and
achievement. The results of regressing learned helplessness scores on the three
epistemological belief scores produced a statistically significant result that explained only
5% of the total variance, leading Qian and Alvermann (1995) to conclude that the
relationship remained inconclusive. One contributing factor to the inconclusive result
may have been due to the low internal consistency (alpha = .49) of the Learned
Helplessness Scale. A more comprehensive review of the relationships among
epistemological beliefs and the achievement variables is provided in a later section.
Beliefs About Learning Questionnaire
Jehng et al. (1993) constructed an instrument based on a similar five-factor model
of epistemological beliefs to that developed by Schommer (1990). The major difference
between the two models was the replacement of the Simple Knowledge dimension with
Orderly Process. Orderly Process reflects students’ understanding of the learning process
and is represented as a continuum ranging from regular to irregular. The construct is
assessed with items such as, “I prefer classes in which students are told exactly what they
are supposed to learn and what they have to do” (Jehng et al., 1993, p. 28). The
instrument was developed using Schommer’s EQ as a foundation, submitting the
instrument to student and faculty groups for evaluation of item validity and clarity,
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followed by item revision or deletion based on student and faculty feedback. The
resulting 51-item instrument was thought to represent the five hypothesized dimensions,
Certainty of Knowledge, Omniscient Authority, Orderly Process, Innate Ability, and
Quick Learning.
The scale was administered to 386 students ranging from freshmen to graduate
students and representing four diverse academic fields. Initial reliability analysis
indicated that 10 items had very low correlations with the scale (< .10) and were
subsequently deleted from the scale. After eliminating these items, the reliability of the
full scale was .84 and the reliabilities of the subscales ranged from .42 to .59. Item
discrimination was examined using item characteristic curves and seven statements
judged to have low discrimination were eliminated from the scale. Confirmatory factor
analysis was used to examine the structure of the final 34 item scale. Chi-square tests
indicated that the five-factor model was a good fit to the data although alternate models
were not tested.
Cole (1996) administered Jehng’s (1993) original, 60 item Beliefs about Learning
Questionnaire to a sample of academically under-prepared, freshmen enrolled in a study
skills course. The instrument was used in a pre-post test design to measure change in
epistemological beliefs during the course.
Due to small sample size (n = 101), item-level factor analysis was deemed
inappropriate and items were grouped into subscales based on previous research by Jehng
et al. (1993) and Schommer (1990). The subscales; Certain Knowledge, Innate Ability,
Omniscient Authority, Quick Process (equivalent to Quick Learning), and Rigid Learning
(equivalent to Orderly Process), were then subjected to factor analysis to assess
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independence and structural stability across two administrations of the instrument. The
results suggested that the factors were not independent, with correlations ranging from
.06 to .59, which contradicted previous research (Jehng et al., 1993).
Initial reliability analysis on the full 60 item scale produced a coefficient alpha
reliability of .74 with subscale alphas of .35, .21, .42, .26 and .44 for Certain Knowledge,
Innate Ability, Omniscient Authority, Quick Process, and Rigid Learning respectively.
Examination of the item-scale correlations, led Cole (1996) to eliminate the 23 items that
produced low (< .10) or negative item-scale correlations. The resulting 37 item scale
produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .78 with subscale reliabilities of .44, 57, .50, .65, and .54.
Exploratory factor analysis was used to evaluate the independence of the subscale scores.
A two factor structure emerged for both pre and post test samples. Quick Process, Innate
Ability, and Omniscient Authority loaded on the first factor and Certain Knowledge and
Rigid Learning formed the second factor. Examination of the procedures used raise more
questions than answers. Cole (1996) makes no mention of preliminary results that lead to
a two factor solution such as eigenvalues, scree plot, or percent of variance explained. In
addition, she did not report any information regarding extraction or rotation procedures
used. She reported exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses as well as structural
equation modeling procedures on a single sample of questionable size to establish and
validate the two factor structure.
A repeated measures MANOVA revealed significant differences in pre and post-
test scores on the Beliefs about Learning Questionnaire after completion of a study skills
course. Subsequent univariate analyses indicated that there were significant differences
in pre-post test scores on the Omniscient Authority, Quick Process, and Rigid Learning
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Scales and no significant differences were found on the Certain Knowledge and Innate
Ability Scales. Unlike previous studies, Cole (1996) found no relationship among
academic success indicators including, high school rank, SAT Verbal and Math scores,
college GPA, and epistemological beliefs.
Item Analysis of the EQ and the Beliefs About Learning Questionnaire
The psychometric properties of popular epistemological beliefs instruments like
the EQ, as well as the factor analytic procedures used for structural analysis have been
criticized (Wood & Kardash, 2002). In an attempt to clarify the dimensionality of the
construct, Wood and Kardash (2002) submitted an 80 item epistemological instrument
composed of 29 items from Shommer’s (1990) Epistemological Questionnaire, 29 items
shared by Schommer’s and Jehng et al.’s instrument, and 22 additional items developed
by Jehng et al. (1993) to more rigorous psychometric analysis. The instrument was
administered to a diverse sample of 793 undergraduate and graduate students. Initial
reliability analysis yielded an internal consistency reliability estimate of .83. Sixteen
items, however, were subsequently eliminated from the instrument due to low or negative
item-scale correlations. The resulting 64 item scale produced an internal consistency
estimate of .86.
A variety of extraction and rotation procedures were used to analyze the structure
of the remaining 64 items. Maximum likelihood, principal components, and generalized
least squares extractions with both orthogonal and oblique rotations generated a similar
pattern of factor loadings. Twenty-six items were eliminated because they had factor
loadings less than .35 or cross loaded on more than one factor. Wood and Kardash
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(2002) ultimately decided to report results on the final 38 item scale using principal axis
factor analysis with Promax rotation. A combination of the size and pattern of
eigenvalues and the scree plot led to a five-factor solution accounting for 22% of the
variance and inter-factor correlations ranging from .00 to .49. Coefficient alpha estimates
of internal consistency reliability ranged from .54 to .74 on the five subscales. Table 3
presents factors reported by Wood and Kardash (2002) including the number of items
defining the factor, the contents of a defining item, and the internal consistency reliability
estimate for the factor. Two additional columns provide corresponding information on
the performance of the same items when analyzed by Schommer (1990) and Jehng et al.
(1993). For example, the factor named Speed of Knowledge Acquisition was defined by
eight items yet those same eight items were associated with four unique factors in
Schommer’s (1990) analysis and two distinct factors in analyses by Jehng et al. (1993).
The most notable observation is the lack of consistency in factor structure across studies
in spite of the use of similar items and analytic techniques.
Table 3: A comparison of factor structure across scales utilizing similar items assessing personal epistemological beliefs.
Wood and Kardash (2002) Factors Schommer (1990) Jehng et al. (1993)** Alpha
Speed of Knowledge Acquisition (8)
“learning is a complex, gradual process requiring








Structure of Knowledge (11)
“knowledge is often complex, interrelated, and
ambiguous” (p. 250)
Simple Knowledge (8) Orderly Process .72
Knowledge Construction and Modification (10)
“knowledge is constantly evolving, is actively
and personally constructed and should be








Characteristics of Successful Students (5)
“ successful students are characterized by their











Attainability of Objective Truth (3)
“skepticism concerning the veridicality of







Note: Number of items is in parentheses. The sophisticated view is presented in italics.
*Failed to load in Schommer’s analysis.




The Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI, Schraw et al.,2002) was developed based
on Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) and represents another attempt to
improve the psychometric characteristics of a general epistemological beliefs scale. The
goal was to develop a shorter instrument that measured all five hypothesized beliefs with
increased reliability and more consistent factor structure.
One hundred sixty undergraduate introductory psychology students completed the
63-item Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ), the 28-item Epistemic Beliefs Inventory
(EBI), and a reading comprehension test. The EQ and EBI were administered a second
time, one month later in order to evaluate test-retest reliability.
The EQ and EBI were subjected to principal factor analysis with both oblique and
orthogonal rotation. Schraw et al. (2002) reported that both analyses led to highly similar
solutions with minimal (< .30) inter-factor correlations; therefore the principal factor
analysis with varimax rotation was reported. The EQ yielded 19 factors with eigenvalues
greater than one but a five factor solution, representing 35% of the total variance, was
selected for rotation based on the theoretical structure of the scale. The EBI generated
five factors with eigenvalues greater than one, representing 60% of the total variance.
The two instruments were administered to the same sample one month later. The
structure of the EQ lacked stability as only two factors were fully replicated (Certain
Knowledge 1 and 2) and one factor (Incremental Learning) was partially replicated. The
remaining two factors were uninterpretable. Test-retest correlations for the two Certain
Knowledge factors were .51 and .67.
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In contrast, three of the EBI factors in the second sample were identical to those
in the first and the two additional factors were nearly identical with the exception of one
statement. The three replicated factors, Omniscient Authority, Certain Knowledge, and
Quick Learning, had test-retest correlations of .66, .81, and .66 respectively. The two
remaining factors, Simple Knowledge and Innate Ability, produced test-retest
coefficients of .64 and .62. The factor structure, descriptions and reliability estimates are
summarized in Table 4.
The relationship between the factors of the EQ and those of the EBI were
examined via zero-order correlations. The correlations were surprisingly small, for
example, the two Innate Ability factors produced a correlation of r = .09. The factors,
Certain Knowledge 1 and Certain Knowledge produced the largest correlation (r = .36)
reported. The lack of evidence of a relationship between the two instruments that were
designed to measure the same construct led Schraw et al. (2002) to conclude, “it is
unclear what these two instruments measure and the extent to which they measure the
same or unrelated constructs” (p. 273).
To date, only one, unpublished study has attempted to validate the factor structure
of the EBI (Huglin, 2003). The EBI was utilized as part of a larger study on the
relationship between epistemological beliefs and learning styles. Because the EBI
validation sample of college students differed from Huglin’s (2003) sample of adult
learners, she conducted an analysis of the reliability and factor structure of the EBI. A
32-item version of the EBI was administered via the internet to 385 adult learners, over
the age of 21, who had obtained at least a bachelor’s degree.
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Table 4: A comparison of the factor structure of the EQ and EBI
EQ EBI








Factor 2 Certain Knowledge 1
Scientists can ultimately
get to the truth.
α = .74
Certain Knowledge
The moral rules I live by
apply to everyone.
α = .62
Factor 3 Incremental Learning
The most successful people have




Working on a problem with no
quick solution is a waste of time.
α = .58
Factor 4 Certain Knowledge 2




Instructors should focus on
facts instead of theories.
α = .62
Factor 5 Integrative Thinking
If a person forgot details, and yet
was able to come up with new




How well you do in school
depends on how smart you are.
α = .62
Note: Largest loading item on each factor is given in italics.
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It should be noted that although Huglin (2003) cites Schraw et al. (2002) as the
source of the EBI items, there are some differences between the scales used in the two
studies. Huglin included four items not reported by Schraw et al. Specifically, these
items were; It bothers me when instructors don’t tell students the answers to complicated
problems, I like teachers who present several competing theories and let their students
decide which is best, The moral rules I live by apply to everyone, and You can study
something for years and still not really understand it. In addition, three items were
reworded. The motivation for these scale changes was not explained.
Principal factor analysis yielded 10 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.
Huglin decided to orthogonally rotate five factors that accounted for 38% of the total
variance, in keeping with the scales hypothesized factor structure. These five factors
were conceptually similar to factors reported by Schraw et al. (2002) and included; Fixed
Ability, Quick Learning, Omniscient Authority, Certain Knowledge, and Simple
Knowledge. Eighteen of the 32 items loaded on their corresponding hypothesized factor.
The remaining 14 items either cross loaded or failed to load on a factor. Coefficient
alpha reliabilities on the subscales ranged from .45 to .70. Huglin (2003) described
reliability and validity issues related to the use of the EBI as “problematic” (p. 73).
Critical Review of General Epistemological Measures
Although general measures of personal epistemology have been widely used in
numerous studies (see Buehl & Alexander, 2001) the nature of the construct appears to
lack structural stability and consistency across studies. The decision regarding the
number of factors to rotate is often based on a single criteria and the final factor solution
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often accounts for very little total variance. In the studies examined using general
epistemological scales, the range of explained variance was 15 to 60%. More
specifically, analyses that used item parcels reported explained variance of 47 to 55%
while item level analyses reported explained variance ranging from 15 to 38%. The only
exception was the initial validation study of the EBI that reported 60% explained
variance.
In addition, internal consistency reliability estimates, when reported, often failed
to meet the widely accepted social science standard of .70. Internal consistency estimates
typically ranged from .45 to .70. More specifically, the average alpha estimate for the
Innate Ability factor was .64 (n = 5). The average estimate for Quick Learning was .69
(n = 4). Certain Knowledge produced an average of .59 (n = 6). The average for Simple
Knowledge was .63 (n = 5) and the average reported alpha for a Source of Knowledge
Factor was .59 (n = 4).
One line of research that offers a hypothetical explanation not only for the domain
differences in epistemological beliefs previously described, but also for the psychometric
inconsistencies in general epistemological belief measures has recently emerged in
science education (Elby & Hammer, 2001; Louca et al., 2004). Elby and Hammer (2001)
challenge the notion that the more sophisticated epistemological position is always the
more relativistic view and contend that an epistemological position can only be
understood as a function of the context of a response. For example, agreement with the
following item on Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire (1990), Being a good
student generally involves memorizing facts, is considered a naïve response but an
epistemologically sophisticated student may agree with the statement knowing that
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memorization is an element of course assessment and higher grades may be achieved by
using memory skills. “Assessment items such as this cannot distinguish between
students’ expectations about that their teachers reward and their epistemological stance
about what constitutes a deeper understanding” (Elby & Hammer, 2001, p. 560).
Epistemological Beliefs, Demographic, and Academic Variables
In spite of the psychometric inadequacies of the previously discussed measures,
epistemological beliefs have been empirically linked to a number of demographic and
academic achievement variables. The studies described below demonstrate that
sophisticated epistemological beliefs consistently predict favorable academic outcomes
lending support to the validity of the construct.
Demographic Variables
There are no consistent findings regarding gender differences and epistemological
beliefs. Researchers have reported no effects, (Buehl et al., 2002; Chan & Elliott, 2002;
Chan, 2003) effects on a single epistemological factor, (Schommer, 1993b; Schommer,
Calvert, Gariglietti, & Bajaj, 1997) and effects on multiple factors (Hofer, 2000; Paulsen
& Wells, 1998). Gender differences in Quick Learning have been documented in both
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies of high school students (Hofer, 2000; Schommer,
1993b; Schommer et al., 1997). Females were less likely to believe learning occurs
quickly or not at all with the gender gap widening from freshman to senior year. In a
study of undergraduates (Hofer, 2000), men were found to view knowledge as more
certain and unchanging and were more likely to rely on authority figures as the source of
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knowledge. Finally, in a study of undergraduates and graduate students across six major
academic areas, Paulsen and Wells (1998) observed more complex gender differences
with women less likely to have naïve beliefs in Fixed Ability or Quick Learning while
more likely to have naïve beliefs in Simple Knowledge.
A more consistent pattern emerges with respect to the relationship of
epistemological beliefs and age with at least three studies documenting a relationship
between Fixed Ability and age (Bendixen et al., 1994; Paulsen & Wells, 1998;
Schommer, 1998). In both college samples (Paulsen & Wells, 1994) and adult samples
(Schommer, 1998) older persons were less like to believe that ability was fixed.
Bendixen et al. (1994) found an indirect relationship between Fixed Ability and age as
both Fixed Ability and age were positively related to lower levels of reflective judgment
The studies just mentioned utilized samples with a substantial range in participant age.
Studies with a more restricted participant age range produce less consistent results. For
example, using similar samples of 18 to 22 year old teacher education students, Chan and
Elliott (2002) failed to find a significant relationship between age and epistemological
beliefs while Chan (2003) found that age was a significant predictor of Authority/Expert
Knowledge.
Educational Level
The relationship between educational level and epistemological beliefs has been
researched with high school (Schommer et al., 1997), collegiate, (Jehng et al., 1993;
Schommer, 1993b), and adult (Schommer, 1998) samples. Across all samples studied
increased levels of education were associated with more sophisticated epistemological
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beliefs. A longitudinal study (Schommer et al., 1997) measured the epistemological
beliefs of high school students during their freshman and senior year and found a
significant main effect for educational level using repeated measures MANOVA. Seniors
had more sophisticated views in each of the four epistemological dimensions measured.
In a study comparing Junior College and University students (Schommer, 1993b), Junior
College students endorsed more naïve beliefs in Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge,
and Quick Learning. The relationship between Quick Learning and educational level
disappeared, however, when the effects of parental education were controlled. Jehng et
al. (1993) reported that graduate students were less likely to endorse Certainty of
Knowledge, Omniscient Authority, or Orderly Process beliefs but found no differences
based on educational level in Innate Ability or Quick Process. Finally, regression
analysis on a large sample of working adults led to the conclusion that more educated
participants were less likely to view knowledge as simple or certain (Schommer, 1998).
GPA/Course Grade
The first evidence of a relationship between epistemological beliefs and academic
performance was a study (Ryan, 1984) that utilized a short 7-item scale to classify
students along a single dimension as either dualistic or relativistic. The more relativistic
a student’s epistemological beliefs the higher their course grade even after academic
aptitude and experience were controlled. More recently, studies utilizing the EQ to
assess epistemological beliefs have found Quick Learning (Schommer, 1993a) and
Simple Knowledge (Paulsen & Wells, 1998) to be significant predictors of GPA. Hofer
(2000) found that students’ scores on the Certainty/Simplicity Scale of a revised general
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epistemological beliefs questionnaire were significantly correlated with course grades in
psychology and science as well as overall GPA.
Academic Achievement Variables
Epistemological beliefs have been linked to a variety of variables associated with
academic achievement including reading comprehension (Ryan, 1984; Schommer, 1990;
Schommer et al., 1992) and meta-cognitive study approaches (Chan, 2003). Specifically,
naïve beliefs in Quick Learning and Certain Knowledge have been associated with
drawing oversimplified, absolutist conclusions from text (Schommer, 1990) and a naïve
view of Simple Knowledge was negatively associated with text comprehension and meta-
comprehension (Schommer et al., 1992). Qian and Alvermann (1995) utilized canonical
correlation to examine the relationship between epistemological beliefs and two
achievement related variables, conceptual understanding and application reasoning. The
single interpretable dimension, defined by Simple/Certain Knowledge (-.87) and Quick
Learning (-.46) accounted for 23% of shared variance in the pair of comprehension
variables. Chan (2003) examined bivariate correlations between epistemological beliefs
and meta-cognitive study approaches and found that Surface Learning was related to
Innate/Fixed Ability, Authority/Expert Knowledge, and Certainty Knowledge while Deep
Process was negatively associated with Effort/Process and Authority/Expert knowledge.
Domain Specific Measures of Epistemological Beliefs
As previously mentioned, exploration of domain differences in epistemological
beliefs developed simultaneously with the multidimensional conceptualization of the
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construct (Jehng et al., 1993; Schommer & Walker, 1995). Initially, domain differences
were explored using general epistemological belief instruments but more recently
researchers have constructed domain specific measures. The following section describes
studies utilizing these measures, their psychometric properties, and evidence of validity.
Hofer (2000) administered the revised epistemological beliefs questionnaire (Qian
& Alvermann, 1995) and a discipline-focused epistemological beliefs questionnaire to
326 freshmen introductory college students. The 27 item discipline-focused
epistemological beliefs questionnaire was adapted from existing instruments including
Perry’s Checklist of Educational Values and Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire
and contained new items generated by a team of researchers familiar with the
epistemological belief literature. Each item in the discipline-focused instrument
references a particular academic field (e.g. psychology or science) and students were
asked to keep the particular discipline in mind as they answered questions.
Principal components analysis of the discipline-focused questionnaire yielded a
four factor solution regardless of the discipline specified (psychology or science) that
explained 46% and 53% of the variance for psychology and science respectively. The
factors were named: (1) Certain/Simple Knowledge, defined by eight items that produced
internal consistency reliability estimates of .74 for psychology and .81 for science; (2)
Justification for Knowing: Personal, consisting of four items with reliability estimates of
.56 for psychology and .61 for science; (3) Source of Knowledge: Authority, consisting
of four items with reliability estimates of .51 for psychology and .64 for science; and (4)
Attainability of Truth, defined by two items with reliability estimates of .60 for
psychology and .75 for science.
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Hofer (2000) factor analyzed the 32 item revised epistemological beliefs
questionnaire, however, the results failed to replicate the one-factor solution reported by
Qian and Alvermann (1995) and produced “no single factor that replicated those factors
reported by Schommer and others when a factor analysis is conducted using subscales”
(p. 392). In order to answer questions regarding construct validity of the new discipline-
focused instrument, Hofer (2000) developed a Certainty/Simplicity of Knowledge scale
using the same 11 items that emerged in Qian and Alvermann’s (1995) factor analysis.
The scale produced an internal consistency reliability estimate of .66. The correlations of
this scale with the corresponding factor of each of discipline-focused scales were .48 for
psychology and .35 for science, indicating that the scales were measuring related but not
identical constructs. A series of dependent t tests were used to evaluate mean differences
between psychology and science scores and produced highly significant differences
(p<.001) on all four epistemological factors. Specifically,
. . .students saw knowledge in science as more certain and unchanging than in
psychology; were more likely to regard personal knowledge and firsthand
experience as a basis for justification of knowing in psychology than in science;
viewed authority and expertise as the source of knowledge more in science than in
psychology; and perceived that in science, more than in psychology, truth is
attainable by experts (Hofer, 2000, p. 394).
Buehl et al. (2002) also developed a domain specific measure of epistemological
beliefs based on Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire and a preliminary study was
conducted to explore the psychometric properties of the initial pool of 82 items. One
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version of the instrument was written with items worded specific to mathematics and one
version written specific to history.
One hundred eighty-two undergraduate students completed one of two parallel
forms of the Preliminary Domain-Specific Beliefs Questionnaire (P-DSBQ). Each form
of the instrument contained 41 items related to history and 41 items related to
mathematics. Of the initial item pool consisting of 164 items (82 positive and negative
item pairs), 76 items (38 pairs) were eliminated based on statistical analysis that indicated
differential response patterns across the two parallel forms. Following elimination of
these items, the scales produced statistically equivalent mean scores as measured by
independent t tests.
The internal consistency reliability coefficients generated for the reduced scales
were .89 for Form A and .88 for Form B. Reliability estimates were also generated for
questions related to each academic domain. These internal consistency estimates were
.84 on both Forms A and B for mathematics and .88 and .86 on Forms A and B
respectively for history.
The factor structure of the revised 44 item scale was examined using exploratory
factor analysis. Factors were extracted using principal axis factor analysis and two
factors were retained accounting for 33% of the variance. Both orthogonal and oblique
factor rotations were examined for interpretation. The factor structures were similar but
the oblique rotation produced a substantial factor correlation and was, therefore, the
factor solution used for interpretation.
The two-factor solution produced a history factor and a mathematics factor. Nine
items failed to load on either factor. Further examination of the factor structure led Buehl
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et al. (2002) to hypothesize that the small sample size in this study may have prevented
the emergence of a four-factor solution. This hypothesis led to a second study with a
larger sample and a more refined set of items.
The second study involved administering a 50 item version of the DBSQ to 633
undergraduate students. Additionally, some of the participants completed Shommer’s
original 63 item Epistemological Questionnaire. Both two-factor and four-factor models
were tested using confirmatory factor analysis. Items were assigned to factors using a
two-step process. First, items were divided by domain and second, items were then sub-
divided into groups based on whether the item represented a belief about the acquisition
of knowledge or a belief about the nature of knowledge. Because the ratio of subjects to
estimated parameters was less than 5 to 1, Buehl et al. (2002) decided to eliminate 12
items from the instrument so that the final instrument consisted of 38 items and produced
a subject to parameter ratio of 6:1. The eliminated items represented the positively
worded items in a sequence of 12 positive-negative item pairs so the negatively worded
counterpart remained a part of the final instrument. The authors reported that the fit
statistics for this model indicated a poor fit to the data.
Buehl et al. (2002) identified 31 scores that they considered outliers and
eliminated these scores. In addition, one item (If it takes a long time to learn a math
concept, it is best to give up) was eliminated due to extreme non-normality and was
replaced by a counter item that had been eliminated earlier. The items were examined
further and the recommendation of Hofer and Pintrich (1997) to separate beliefs about
learning and intelligence from beliefs about knowledge was followed. The result was the
elimination of items that referred to the speed of learning and innate ability. The final
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scale, consisting of 22 items was then subjected to confirmatory analysis using maximum
likelihood estimation. The Chi-Square and CFI estimates reflected significant
improvements to model fit, but were not high enough to indicate a good fit to the data.
Final adjustments were made by allowing for correlated error terms among items
with similar wording and, once again, model fit was significantly improved and the four-
factor model was judged to produce a good fit. This model was compared to one- and
two-factor domain-general models and two- and three-factor domain-specific models and
all four comparisons resulted in a significant Chi-Square difference in favor of the four
factor model. The factors of the final 22 item scale were:
• Need for Effort in Mathematics (alpha = .68)
• Integration of Information and Problem Solving in Mathematics (alpha = .70)
• Need for Effort in History (alpha = .61)
• Integration of Information and Problem Solving in History (alpha = .75).
The internal consistency reliability estimate for the full scale was .83.
Concurrent validity was assessed by comparing responses on Schommer’s EQ to
responses on the DSBQ using the correlations of the factor composite scores and the
overall composite score for each instrument. The correlation between the EQ and the
DSBQ was -.46 and the correlations among the sub-scales ranged from -.04 to -.35. EQ
factors, Fixed Ability and Quick Learning, were significantly correlated with all four
factors of the DSBQ and Simple Knowledge and Certain Knowledge were significantly
correlated with both Integration of Information in Mathematics and Integration of
Information in History.
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A third study was conducted to provide additional support of the four-factor
structure and to study gender differences. Undergraduate students (n = 523) were
administered the 22-time DSBQ. After deletion of several cases that contributed to non-
normality in the data the model fit was similar to that reported in the second study
providing additional support for the four-factor domain specific structure of the DSBQ.
The internal consistency reliability estimate for the full-scale was .82 with sub-scale
estimates ranging from .58 to .72.
Domain Specific Outcomes
Studies that explore domain specific outcomes vary substantially in methodology
making results difficult to compare. Some researchers (Jehng et al., 1993; Paulsen &
Wells, 1998) explore differences by comparing students from different academic
disciplines on general epistemological measures. Others (Hofer, 2000; Schommer &
Walker, 1995) ask students to respond to general epistemological measures while keeping
a particular academic domain in mind. At least one study mixed the two strategies
(Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003). The review of studies presented in this section will
reveal that very different conclusions result based on which approach is used.
Jehng et al. (1993) found significant differences in students’ epistemological
beliefs when grouped by academic discipline based on the results of a MANOVA.
Specifically, significant differences were found on the Certainty of Knowledge,
Omniscient Authority, and Orderly Process factors between students enrolled in
engineering or business programs and those enrolled in arts/humanities or social science
programs. Business and engineering students exhibited more naïve epistemological
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beliefs than students in the humanities or social sciences. No significant differences were
found in either Innate Ability or Quick Process scores across academic discipline.
Schommer and Walker (1995) took an entirely different approach to the
exploration of domain specific epistemological beliefs and the result was just the opposite
of that described by Jehng et al. (1993). Each participant in Schommer’s and Walker’s
(1995) study completed the Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) twice, once with the
reminder to keep the social sciences such as psychology or sociology in mind as
responses were made and once with the reminder to keep mathematics in mind. The
study was completed with two undergraduate samples (n = 94 and 114) and the only
difference in the design of the second study was the addition of a control group that was
instructed to keep social sciences in mind both times the EQ was completed. In addition,
the instrument used with the second sample was altered slightly to include more frequent
domain reminders.
The results of both studies were very similar in that both provided support for the
finding that epistemological beliefs are similar across domains. Each of the four
epistemological factors, Fixed Learning, Simple Knowledge, Quick Learning, and
Certain Knowledge were significantly correlated across domains with correlations
ranging from .41 to .67. The results of regression analyses were also strikingly similar
across domains with Certain Knowledge in both social science and mathematics
functioning as the only significant predictor of Social Science performance. Likewise,
Simple Knowledge for both social sciences and mathematics functioned as the only
significant predictor of mathematics performance.
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Additional studies (Paulsen & Wells, 1998; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003) using
the EQ to measure domain differences utilized the Biglan classification system to ensure
better representation across various academic disciplines. Researches have found
Biglan’s scheme an efficient way to categorize academic disciplines and have
documented discipline differences in teaching goals, evaluation and grading practices,
knowledge validation processes, and graduate student characteristics. (Barnes, Bull,
Campbell, & Perry, 2001; Donald, 1990; Hativa & Marincovich, 1996; Malaney, 1986).
Biglan (1973a) developed a multidimensional system to characterize various
academic disciplines. The first dimension is generally labeled hard-soft because it
distinguishes fields like engineering and the sciences from fields like humanities and the
social sciences. Another way to characterize this dimension is that it distinguishes
paradigmatic fields from those that are not. Paradigm, in this context, refers to “a body
of theory which is subscribed to by all members of the field” (p. 201). Paradigmatic or
hard disciplines have an agreed upon content and methodology that can foster absolutist
thinking. In soft areas there is less theoretical consensus hence relativistic thinking is
encouraged. This dimension has emerged as the most prominent in making group
distinctions (Donald, 1990; Malaney, 1986)
The second dimension is generally referred to as pure-applied and distinguishes
fields like education and agriculture that focus on practical application from fields like
philosophy or history that are more abstract or theoretical. The third dimension, named
life-non life, distinguishes fields that focus on living things like biology or psychology
from fields that focus on inanimate objects such as computer science or economics.–
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It is difficult to directly compare the results of the previously mentioned studies
that utilize the Biglan scheme because the methodology and data analysis differed
substantially leading to different conclusions. Paulsen and Wells (1998) focused on
differences between various academic majors using a series of ANOVAs. They found
that students enrolled in pure academic fields like humanities, social sciences,
mathematics, or the natural sciences generally have more sophisticated beliefs than those
enrolled in applied areas like education, business or engineering. The results of a
multiple regression analysis indicated that students in pure fields had more sophisticated
beliefs in Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge, and Quick Learning. Students in soft
domains such as the humanities, social sciences, education, and business were more
likely to have sophisticated beliefs regarding Certain Knowledge than those in hard
domains like math, engineering, and the natural sciences. It is unfortunate that a factorial
design was not utilized in the analysis as this may have provided more insightful
information regarding the pattern of mean differences in epistemological beliefs.
Schommer-Aikins et al. (2003) asked students simply to keep a particular domain,
mathematics, social sciences, or business, in mind as they answered a general
epistemological beliefs scale. This study differed from Schommer’s and Walker’s (1995)
previous study only in that Biglan’s (1973a, 1973b) classification system was used to
select disciplines that represented both hard-soft and pure-applied disciplines. A series
of regression analyses demonstrated that math beliefs could be predicted from both social
science and business beliefs and led to the conclusion that “epistemological beliefs of
college students are moderately domain general” (Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003, p. 360).
Manuscript reviewers encouraged the authors to re-analyze the data based on academic
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experience. Bivariate correlations were used to assess similarities and differences in
epistemological beliefs based on the number of courses completed in each academic area
(i.e. mathematics, social science, and business). Schommer-Aikins et al. (2003)
concluded that the pattern of correlations supported domain generality for students with
either high or low exposure to the academic areas being compared. The pattern of
correlations supported a domain specific view when exposure varied between disciplines
(i.e. high exposure to one area and low exposure to another). These results appear
tenuous at best based on the methodology used. A more sophisticated multivariate
analysis may have been a more appropriate way to address the question of domain
differences.
Hofer (2000) explored discipline specific epistemological beliefs in a similar
manner by having undergraduates (n = 326) complete two versions of a discipline-
focused epistemological beliefs questionnaire, one for psychology and one for science.
The instruments were identical except for the insertion of the word psychology or science
in the items. Results of a series of dependent t tests revealed significant differences by
discipline. Hofer (2000) further explored discipline based differences by conducting a
repeated measures MANOVA comparing science and social science majors on the four
factors of each of the two discipline-focused epistemological instruments. No
multivariate effects were found but there was a significant univariate effect of major for
the attainability of truth factor, with science majors more likely to view truth as
attainable.
Buehl et al. (2002) conducted a repeated measures MANOVA using academic
discipline (mathematics and history) as the repeated measure and the four factors of the
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DSBQ as the dependent variables. Buehl et al. (2002) reported a significant main effect
for domain and further analysis revealed significant domain differences with regard to the
effort required to gain knowledge and beliefs about the integration of knowledge.
“Specifically, students believed that the acquisition of mathematics knowledge required
more effort than history knowledge . . .[and] students . . . believed that knowledge in
mathematics was more integrated with other domains than history” (p. 438). These
findings were replicated in a subsequent study that also examined gender differences.
It appears that students can hold both domain specific and domain general beliefs
simultaneously. Students from different academic disciplines do seem to hold differing
epistemological beliefs with students in mathematics and science programs holding less
relativistic views of knowledge than students in the social science, arts, and humanities
programs. Additionally, student’s beliefs appear to remain consistent across domains as
responses of individual students change little even when prompted to consider a different
domain. None of the previous studies attempted to generate a scale that included items
contextually specific to a particular domain. In fact, Buehl et al. (2002) specifically
eliminated items that would not work well across domains. For example, the item, “In
math class, all you really need to know is how to use the formulas” (p. 423), was
eliminated because replacing the word math with the word history would not have
worked. To date, no contextually appropriate domain specific instrument has been tested.
The following sections describe two constructs related to general epistemological
beliefs, implicit theories and math specific beliefs. When Schommer (1990)
reconceptualized epistemological beliefs as a multidimensional construct, she utilized
research regarding both implicit theories of intelligence and math beliefs to define two
70
dimensions later referred to as Innate Ability and Quick Learning. There has been
subsequent debate (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) as to whether these dimensions should be
included with epistemological beliefs or whether they represent related but peripheral
constructs. Both the general and mathematics related epistemological belief scales used
in the current study include these dimensions. The following is a comprehensive
description of the development of these constructs along with a review of a recent
empirical study that explored the relationship between implicit theories and general
epistemological beliefs.
Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Achievement Goals
Implicit theories of intelligence refer to a person’s belief that intelligence is either
flexible and adaptable or is fixed and unchanging (i.e. you have what you were born with
and nothing more). The former view is referred to as an incremental theory of
intelligence and the latter, an entity theory (Dweck, 2000). Implicit theories of
intelligence have been empirically linked to learner response to challenging tasks via
achievement goals.
Incrementalists believe that intelligence is malleable, that it can be increased with
effort and practice, and tend to disagree with statements such as, “You can learn new
things but you can’t really change your basic intelligence” (Dweck, 2000, p. 21). Because
incrementalists see intelligence as something under personal control, they are less
threatened with failure and view hard work and persistence as a way to improve their
skills. Students with an incremental view of intelligence tend to adopt learning goals in
challenging situations as they are primarily concerned with mastering new skills. They
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are likely to intensify their efforts at problem solving when challenged and they do not
view difficulty or failure as a reflection on their intelligence.
Entity theorists view intelligence as a fixed trait that cannot really change much.
With no personal control over their intelligence, failure becomes an indicator of personal
inadequacies leading to an avoidance response in order to protect self-image. Dweck and
Leggett (1988) reported that, in an experimental study with middle school children,
students with an entity view tried to preserve self-image by demonstrating competence in
other areas. She writes, “more than two thirds of the[se] . . . children (but virtually none
of the mastery-oriented ones) engaged in task-irrelevant verbalizations, usually of
diversionary or self-aggrandizing nature” (pp. 257-258). Further, students with an entity
view of intelligence will tend to adopt performance goals when academically challenged.
Students who adopt performance goals are primarily concerned with their standing in
relation to others, “so when they do poorly they may condemn their intelligence and fall
into a helpless response” (Dweck, 2000, p. 16).
To reiterate, students will generally perform equally well on tasks that are well
within their ability regardless of their view of intelligence or their achievement goal
orientation. The major behavioral and emotional differences are seen when students are
confronted with difficult or challenging tasks. As long as confidence in one’s ability
regarding any particular task is high, both performance and learning goals will produce
mastery oriented behaviors and positive affect. It is only when confidence is low that a
behavioral difference emerges. Students who adopt learning goals continue to persist and
do not take failure personally, whereas students adopting performance goals take failure
very personally, blaming their failure on intellectual inadequacy.
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These behavioral responses have both situational and dispositional elements.
Although people have a predisposition toward adoption of either learning or performance
goals, Dweck (2000) has demonstrated in a variety of studies that situational elements
can alter goal choice and subsequent behavioral responses to challenges. This theory
provides a framework for assessing the dispositional tendencies of students and
generating situational interventions when a maladaptive response interferes with
cognitive or social skills.
A number of researchers are using Goal Orientation Theory in motivational
research (Arias, 2002; Button, Mathieu, & Zajac, 1996; Kaplan & Maehr, 1999; Meece,
Blumenfeld, & Hoyle, 1988; Midgley et al., 1998; Nicholls, Cobb, Wood, Yackel, &
Patashnick, 1990; Seegers, van Putten, de Brabander, 2002; Strange, 1997; Wolters,
2004; Yorke & Knight, 2004) and, although the terminology changes somewhat, the
defining characteristics of performance and leaning goals remains consistent. Goals that
focus on ability development are referred to as learning, mastery, and/or task involvement
goals and goals that focus on the demonstration of ability are termed performance,
ability, and/or ego involvement goals (Midgley et al., 1998).
The results of numerous studies consistently demonstrate that achievement goals
are correlated with a number of cognitive and affective variables. Task or learning goals
have been positively correlated with cognitive variables such as deep strategy use
(Anderman & Young, 1994), active cognitive engagement (Meece et al., 1988), adaptive
cognitive strategies in Math and English classes (Midgely et al., 1998), effort and
persistence (Wolters, 2004), and the belief that success depends on interest, effort, and
attempts to make sense of things (Nicholls et al., 1990). Performance or ego goals have
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been associated with use of surface strategies (Anderman & Young, 1994), superficial
engagement (Meece et al., 1988), maladaptive cognitive strategies in Math and English
(Midgley et al., 1998), and the belief that success depends on superior ability and
attempts to beat others (Nicholls et al., 1990). Kaplan and Maehr (1999) found task goals
correlated negatively with disruptive classroom behavior and positively with impulse
control and affect at school while ego goals were oppositely correlated with the same
variables. Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) conducted an extensive review of the
literature regarding the relationship between Achievement Goal Theory and affect
concluding that mastery goals are positively correlated with positive affect and negatively
correlated with negative affect while performance goals are positively correlated with
negative affect.
Evidence of achievement goals appears under other names as well. For example,
Joe Garofalo (1994) labeled students as meaning-oriented or number-oriented based on
whether they focused on meaningful interpretation or mechanical computation as they
solved problems. He found that meaning-oriented students were more willing to work
complicated and non-routine problems while number-oriented students preferred short,
simple problems that were similar to example problems.
Some researchers working with Achievement Goal Theory have proposed a
revision to normative goal theory, a term used to describe the classic mastery-
performance dichotomy (Arias, 2002; Harackiewicz, Barron, Pintrich, Elliot, & Thrash,
2002). The key element of this revised theory, called multiple goal perspective, is the
division of performance goals into to sub-goals, performance approach (i.e. attain
success) and performance avoidance (i.e. avoid failure). The basis for the revised theory
74
was an analysis of a number of goal theory studies that revealed significant performance
approach effects on performance outcomes and significant mastery goal effects on
interest outcomes leading to the conclusion that “mastery and performance-approach
goals independently promoted different achievement outcomes: Students adopting both
goals are optimally motivated. . .” (Harackiewicz et al., 2002, p. 642).
Recently, a four factor structure of achievement goals has been proposed (Grant
& Dweck, 2003) consisting of Outcome, Ability, Normative, and Learning Goals. This
represents a refinement of the extensively researched two factor model. Learning Goals,
although still represented as a single factor, now contains items specific to learning as
well as items that reference more general academic challenges. Performance Goals are
divided into two factors, Ability Goals and Normative Goals. Ability Goals represent the
importance of demonstrating or validating intelligence through academic activities.
Normative Goals are similar to Ability Goals but are specifically focused on comparisons
to other students. The fourth factor, Outcome Goals, taps students’ desire to do well on a
particular task and is related to both Performance and Learning Goals. Learning Goals
were empirically associated with a number of positive learner outcomes including higher
intrinsic motivation, deeper processing, and higher grades compared to students who
adopt Ability Goals (Grant & Dweck, 2003). In addition, students who adopt Ability
Goals experience a loss of self-worth, tend to withdraw more quickly from challenges,
and have a greater tendency to ruminate.
Schommer (1990) utilized research on implicit theories of intelligence (Dweck &
Leggett, 1988) in the development of her original Epistemological Questionnaire, leading
one to hypothesize that some relationship should exist between the constructs. A recent
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study was designed specifically to test this hypothesis (Braten & Stomso, 2005).
Interestingly, correlations between three of the four variables representing dimensions of
epistemological beliefs (i.e. Speed of Knowledge Acquisition, Certainty of Knowledge,
and Knowledge Construction and Modification) and the two variables measuring self-
theories of intelligence (i.e. entity and incremental) were negligible, ranging from -.07 to
.06 in a sample of 286 Norwegian business and education students. The fourth
epistemological variable, Control of Knowledge Acquisition correlated moderately with
the entity and incremental theory variables (r = .26 and -.34 respectively). This fourth
factor, often named Innate Ability in other research using Schommer’s (1990) EQ,
contains items that are worded very similarly to the items in the Theories of Intelligence
Scale (Dweck, 2000). Although these correlations are statistically significant, one would
expect them to be much higher as they seem to measure the same construct. The authors
conclude that although counterintuitive, “the dimensions of personal epistemology
concerning the speed and control of knowledge acquisition represent constructs separate
from the construct of implicit theories of intelligence” (Braten & Stromso, 2005, p. 558).
Mathematics Specific Epistemological Beliefs
“Students’ mathematics-related beliefs are the implicitly or explicitly held
subjective conceptions students hold to be true that influence their mathematical learning
and problem solving” (Op’T Eynde, DeCorte, & Verschaffel, 2002, p. 24). Although
there is no comprehensive theoretical model of mathematical beliefs, common themes are
found across studies (Kloosterman, 2002; Lerch, 2004; Mtetwa & Garofalo, 1989;
Schoenfeld, 1989) and include the following:
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 Mathematics knowledge is static.
 The goal of problem solving is to produce the “right” answer.
 Mathematics knowledge is passively received from a teacher.
 Mathematics skill is either something you have or you don’t.
Mathematics beliefs have been shown to influence student engagement, effective strategy
use in problem solving, and academic achievement (Lerch, 2004; Schommer-Aikins et
al., 2005). Additionally, more sophisticated math beliefs have been associated with
intrinsic motivation, self-efficacy, and self-regulation (Hofer, 1999).
A number of attempts have been made to quantitatively measure mathematics
beliefs (Hofer, 1999; Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Koller, 2001; Op’t Eynde & DeCorte,
2003; Schoenfeld, 1989). One of the first published scales (Schoenfeld, 1989) consisted
of 60 Likert-style items, 10 demographic items, and 11 short answer questions and was
administered to 230 high school geometry students. No formal psychometric analysis
was reported as Schoenfeld simply used comparisons of sub-scale scores and item means
as well as sub-scale correlations to explore particular aspects of student beliefs.
The instrument tapped a number of elements of student beliefs including
attributions of success or failure, perceptions of mathematics, comparisons of student
views of mathematics, English, and social studies, and student motivation. Schoenfeld
(1989) reported that epistemological beliefs vary by discipline and that students were
more likely to credit native ability for success in math than either English or social
studies. Students believed that memorization was required to master content, believed
that problems should take no more than five minutes to complete, and lacked an
integrated view of mathematics because they didn’t make conceptual connections.
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Schoenfeld concluded that even in the best educational environments (e.g. upper level
courses with effective teachers and motivated college bound students) math instruction
can result in an understanding of mathematics as a sequence of rules and procedures and
a lack of integration of major concepts. In spite of a lack of psychometric information,
most subsequently developed instruments, including Schommer’s (1990) Epistemological
Questionnaire have used elements of this initial instrument.
Kloosterman and Stage (1992) developed the Indiana Mathematics Belief Scale to
measure beliefs regarding the problem solving process. The five beliefs that were
included in the final version of the scale include:
 I can solve time-consuming mathematics problems.
 There are word problems that cannot be solved with simple, step-by-step
procedures.
 Understanding concepts is important in mathematics.
 Word problems are important in mathematics.
 Effort can increase mathematical ability.
After refinement through pilot testing, the final 30-item instrument was administered to
517 college students with diverse experiences in mathematics including both those
enrolled in developmental math courses and those who had successfully completed
multiple college level mathematics courses. Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the five
scales ranged from .54 to .84. Inter-scale correlations ranged from -.02 to .29 reflecting
relative independence of the five scales. Kloosterman and Stage (1992) did not report
that any validity research was conducted as part of the development of this instrument. In
view of the very limited information regarding the psychometric characteristics of the
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scales and the lack of subsequent research utilizing the Indiana Mathematics Belief
Scales, it is impossible to posit an evaluative judgment of this instrument.
The first scale to overtly combine personal epistemology theory and mathematics
beliefs was a brief, six-item scale that measured two epistemological factors, Simple
Beliefs and Isolated Beliefs (Hofer, 1999). Due to low internal consistency reliability
estimates (α = .48 and .41) the items were combined into a single math beliefs scale (α =
.54). Bivariate correlations among math beliefs and a variety of academic variables were
analyzed and, in spite of low reliability estimates, math beliefs were significantly
correlated with intrinsic motivation, self-efficacy, self-regulation, and course grades.
This study represents a small psychometric step forward in that a brief description of
factor analytic procedures was provided, reliability estimates were reported, and an
attempt was made to establish the validity of the instrument through correlational
associations with related variables.
A more recent attempt (Koller, 2001) was made to measure math specific
epistemological beliefs using a combination of Schommer’s (1990) multi-dimensional
epistemological beliefs and Schoenfeld’s (1983) cognitive requirements for success in
mathematics, focusing on a specific category, belief systems. The measure was
developed as part of a research project to test the effects of math beliefs on achievement
via three mediator variables, interest, learning strategies, and course selection.
Eighteen items were developed measuring four aspects of mathematics related
beliefs; constructive conception, certain knowledge, simple knowledge, and relevance of
mathematics. The instrument was administered to 2138 German secondary students.
Internal consistency reliability estimates ranged from .47 for Certain Knowledge to .77
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on the Relevance scale. Small to moderate inter-scale correlations ranged from .03 to
.28. In spite of low reliability estimates, all four dimensions proved to be significant
predictors of student achievement in a subsequent path analysis.
In response to the lack of a comprehensive model of mathematics-related beliefs,
the Student’s Mathematics-Related Beliefs Questionnaire (MRBQ) was developed to
validate the structure of mathematics-related beliefs systems (Op’t Eynde & DeCorte,
2003). The MRBQ included items addressing beliefs about mathematics education,
beliefs about the self as a learner of mathematics, and beliefs about the influence of the
teacher. The initial item pool of 58 items was administered to 365 Flemish junior high
school students. Principal components analysis yielded a four factor solution accounting
for 38% of total variance. The factors were labeled; Beliefs about the role and
functioning of the teacher, Beliefs about the significance of and competence in
mathematics, Mathematics as a social activity, and Mathematics as a domain of
excellence. The four scales produced internal consistency reliability estimates of .92, .89,
.65 and .69 respectively. Inter-factor correlations ranged from .21 to .48 and may
indicate the presence of a higher order factor, although this was not explored. No
additional variables were included in the study and, therefore, additional evaluation of the
validity of the MRBQ is not possible.
In a recent review of the status of the measurement of mathematics beliefs,
DeCorte et al. (2002) indicate that a better understanding of mathematics beliefs is
needed including the “relationship between mathematics-related beliefs and the more
general epistemological beliefs” (p. 315). Existing instruments have little or no
psychometric information with which to judge the reliability and validity, therefore,
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“more comprehensive instruments have to be designed and validated” (DeCorte et al.,
2002, p. 315).
Summary
Although psychometric inadequacies persist, epistemological beliefs have been
linked to a number of desirable learner outcomes. It appears that epistemological beliefs
function independently of other variables related to learner outcomes like motivation and
ability. It is currently unclear whether mathematics related beliefs are simply a domain-
specific variation of general epistemological beliefs or represent a unique but related
construct. The current study represents the first attempt to explore these relationships
utilizing a contextualized mathematics beliefs instrument and a general measure of
epistemological beliefs as well as measures of related peripheral constructs about the
nature of learning and the nature of intelligence. A need has been expressed (Muis,
2004) for a better understanding of the relationship between student beliefs, learning
environments, and the influence of teacher’s beliefs on student beliefs. These questions





Researchers need better instrumentation and methodology to
construct a better theoretical and applied understanding of epistemic beliefs.
(Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002, p.273)
The purpose of the current chapter is to describe various methodological elements
of the study including sample characteristics, instruments used to measure constructs of
interest, data collection procedures, and statistical analyses.
Participants
The sample included students at a large Midwestern university and a small
Midwestern community college. Attempts were made to achieve heterogeneity of age,
academic classification, and field of study to the greatest extent possible, as these
variables have been associated with differences in epistemological beliefs. Various
course instructors were asked to allow a regularly scheduled class session to be used for
data collection. Data collection began in November 2006 and concluded in February
2007 when the minimum required sample of 300 completed questionnaires was achieved
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
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The final sample consisted of 316 participants from four campus locations.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 55 with a mean age of 25.3 years. The majority
(70%) of participants were female and 67% were White. The desired heterogeneity was
achieved with regard to academic classification and to a lesser extent with regard to
academic major. Specifically, the community college sample was fairly balanced across
both the hard/soft and pure/applied dimensions of the Biglan (1973a) classification
system while the soft and applied dimensions dominated the university sample. A more
detailed description of participant demographics is provided in Table 5.
Instruments
The following section provides a detailed description of each of the instruments
used to measure constructs of interest in the current study. Item development for the
EBSM is detailed including the theoretical basis for each of the hypothesized factors. In
addition, descriptions of each of the scales included for validation are provided. These
descriptions include information related to the development and validation of the scales
as well as previously published psychometric properties including factor structure and
reliability estimates.
Demographic Information
A brief demographic questionnaire that included age, gender, ethnicity, academic
classification, college major, career goal, international student status, and the number of
mathematics courses completed in high school or college was presented in the
participant’s packets. In addition, participants could choose to endorse any number of a
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variety of statements that reflect common attitudes toward mathematics or write their
own statement (see Appendix F).










Male 45 (24.2) 48 (36.9) 93 (29.4)
Female 141 (75.8) 81 (62.3) 222 (70.3)
No Response 0 (0.0) 1 (0.8) 1 (0.3)
Ethnicity
Hispanic 1 (0.5) 5 (3.8) 6 (1.9)
Native American 45 (24.2) 12 (9.2) 57 (18.0)
Asian American 1 (0.5) 4 (3.1) 5 (1.6)
African American 16 (8.6) 4 (3.1) 20 (6.3)
White 116 (62.4) 95 (73.1) 211 (66.8)
Multi-Racial 2 (1.1) 5 (3.8) 7 (2.2)
Other 2 (1.1) 4 (3.1) 6 (1.9)
No Response 3 (1.6) 1 (0.8) 4 (1.3)
Biglan classification by major
Pure & Hard 34 (18.3) 1 (0.8) 35 (11.1)
Pure & Soft 43 (23.1) 17 (13.1) 60 (19.0)
Applied & Hard 54 (29.0) 7 (5.4) 61 (19.3)
Applied & Soft 55 (29.6) 104 (80.0) 159 (50.3)
No Response 0 (0.0) 1 (0.8) 1 (0.3)
Classification
Freshman 40 (21.5) 1 (0.8) 41 (13.0)
Sophomore 122 (65.6) 0 (0.0) 122 (38.6)
Junior 17 (9.1) 24 (18.5) 41 (13.0)
Senior 7 (3.8) 73 (56.1) 80 (25.3)
Graduate 0 (0.0) 29 (22.3) 29 (9.2)
No Response 0 (0.0) 3 (2.3) 3 (0.9)
Note: Percent of column total in parentheses.
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Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics
The Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics (EBSM, see Appendix A)
was developed for this study using literature from both general epistemological beliefs
and mathematics related beliefs. Seven distinct dimensions were identified and labeled,
Source of Knowledge, Certainty of Knowledge, Structure of Knowledge, Speed of
Knowledge Acquisition, Innate Ability- General, Innate Ability-Personal, and Real-
World Applicability, based on previously published research (Schoenfeld, 1989;
Schommer, 1990). Ten to twelve statements were written for each dimension using a
variety of previously published epistemological and mathematical belief instruments
(Buehl, 2003; Elby, 2001; Koller, 2001; Op’t Eynde & DeCorte, 2003; Schoenfeld, 1989;
Schommer, 1990) and revising as necessary for the current study. Some statements were
reworded to reflect beliefs specific to mathematics and some of the language was
changed to reflect the perspective of the student rather than a judgment. For example, an
EQ item that measures Ability to Learn, Everyone needs to learn how to learn, was
revised to read, Learning good study skills can improve my math ability.
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory
The Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) consists of 28 items measuring five
dimensions of general epistemological beliefs (see Appendix B). Coefficient alpha
reliability estimates reported for the validation sample of 160 undergraduate university
students ranged from .58 to .68. Test-retest correlations were reported to range from .62
to .81. Although these reliability estimates are less than optimal, they are typical of
reliability estimates reported in psychometric studies of general epistemological beliefs.
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Schraw et al. (2002) developed the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) as a
response to many of the psychometric inadequacies of Schommer’s (1990)
Epistemological Questionnaire. Items were developed and refined to measure the same
five dimensions first hypothesized by Schommer including, Certain Knowledge, Simple
Knowledge, Quick Learning, Omniscient Authority, and Innate Ability. Although the
only additional validation study of the EBI is an unpublished doctoral dissertation
(Huglin, 2003), it remains the most psychometrically sound measure of general
epistemological beliefs currently available. The purpose of including it in the current
study is to assess the relationship between domain-specific epistemological beliefs as
measured by the Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics and general
epistemological beliefs. In addition, inclusion of the instrument provided an opportunity
to explore the structural validity of the EBI through exploratory factor analysis.
Achievement Goal Inventory
The Achievement Goal Inventory (Grant & Dweck, 2003) represents the most
recent refinement in Achievement Goal Theory research (see Appendix C). The
instrument is based on previous research by Dweck (2000) and other Achievement Goal
Orientation researchers (Midgley et al., 1998; Nicholls et al., 1990). The instrument
measures four distinct but related goal orientation factors, Outcome Goals, Ability Goals,
Normative Goals (including both normative outcome and normative ability goals), and
Learning Goals (including both learning and challenge-mastery goals). The instrument
was developed and validated through a sequence of studies including a preliminary pilot
study followed by a sequence of five validation studies.
86
Grant and Dweck (2003) constructed the final 18 item version of the instrument
by selecting the three items on each of the six preliminary scales that produced the
highest internal consistency reliability estimates for the 560 participant pilot sample.
Subsequent factor analysis produced four factors and the coefficient alpha reliability
estimates for each of the final four scales were: Outcome goals, .85; Ability goals, .81;
Normative goals (outcome and ability), .92; and Learning goals (learning and challenge-
mastery), .86. Confirmatory factor analysis provided support for the hierarchical four
factor model. Test-retest reliability was evaluated on an independent sample of 54
participants and correlations between the two sets of scores ranged from .69 to .88 with
an average correlation of .79 (Grant & Dweck, 2003).
The Achievement Goal Inventory appears to be both a reliable and valid measure
of achievement goals. This measure also reflects the latest developments in Achievement
Goal Theory with the refinement of the former two factor model that included only
performance and learning goals into a four factor hierarchical model that better reflects
subtle variations within both performance and learning goals.
Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale
The Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale (see Appendix D) is an eight item,
Likert-type scale designed to measure one’s implicit theory of intelligence. This is a
unidimensional construct that ranges from fixed to malleable, termed entity and
incremental respectively. The scale originally consisted of three items reflecting only an
entity view, as the incremental items produced universal endorsement. The scale has
been revised (Dweck, 2000) by designing incremental items that do not generate over-
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endorsement. Entity and incremental items have a strong negative correlation, providing
additional support for the unidimensionality of the construct.
Published validation studies (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995) were conducted using
a shorter scale that consisted of three entity items. The scale was evaluated in a series of
six studies with sample sizes ranging from 32 to 184. The coefficient alpha estimates of
internal consistency ranged from .94 to .98. Test-retest reliability was evaluated in one of
the validation studies and produced a correlation coefficient equal to .80. In a discussion
of the scales validity, the authors demonstrate discriminant validity through a factor
analysis of three implicit theory scales, implicit theory of morality, implicit theory of
intelligence, and implicit theory of the world. In five separate factor analyses three
distinct factors emerged with identical structure across studies and factor loadings
ranging from .74 to .96. These studies provided support for the conceptualization of
one’s implicit theory of intelligence as distinct from one’s implicit theory of morality or
the world. Additional analysis revealed that implicit theories are unrelated to
demographic variables such as gender and age as well as political or religious affiliation.
Additionally, there was no evidence for confounding with either self-presentation or
social desirability and the scales were unrelated to cognitive ability, intellectual self-
efficacy, or self-esteem.
The Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale appears to be a reliable and valid
measure of one’s implicit theory of intelligence. Although published psychometric
analysis of the newer eight-item version of the scale is not available, the use of the
instrument provides opportunity to examine the psychometric properties of the longer
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instrument and, if needed, the well established and frequently used subset of entity items
can be used in subsequent analysis.
Procedures
Participants were informed of their rights, provided an explanation of the purpose
of the study, and provided a copy of the IRB approved informed consent. Those who
chose to participate were given a packet that included, a brief demographic survey, the
Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics (EBSM), the Epistemic Beliefs
Inventory (EBI), the Achievement Goal Inventory (AGI), and the Implicit Theories of
Intelligence Scale (TIS). A random arrangement of the EBSM items was presented first,
followed by a random presentation of items from the EBI, AGI, and TIS. All scales were
measured using a six-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 6
(very strongly agree). In addition, three brief scenarios (see Appendix F), modified from
the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory for Physics (EBAPS, Elby, 2001), were inserted
into the scale. One scenario was placed in the midst of the EBSM and the other two were
equally spaced in the midst of the remaining scales. These scenarios served two
purposes. First, they functioned to improve the validity of participant response by
interrupting the flow of the Likert-type items. Second, the scenarios were used to
evaluate how participant responses to briefer scale stems correspond to more
contextualized scenarios designed to evaluate the same construct.
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Analysis
All analyses were conducted using SPSS 14.0. Traditional psychometric analysis
of the EBSM, EBI, AGI, and TIS included exploratory factor analysis to assess the
dimensional structure of each scale followed by reliability analysis. Exploratory factor
analysis included an assessment of each inter-item matrix for factorability. This
assessment consisted of visual inspection of the inter-item correlation matrix followed by
statistical tests to evaluate the factorability of the correlation matrix including Bartlett’s
test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test of sampling adequacy. The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy is a ratio of shared inter-item variance to
total variance. A general rule of thumb is that KMO should be at least .60 to consider
factor analysis appropriate for the data. Bartlett’s test of spherictiy is a statistical test of
the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix. A significant value
indicates that the correlation matrix differs significantly from identity.
These diagnostic procedures were followed by exploratory factor analysis. Factor
extraction procedures included principal axis factor analysis (PAF) and, in some cases,
principal components analysis (PCA). Gorsuch (1983) provides several reasons that he
prefers factor analysis over components analysis. One argument is that the assumption of
error free measurement in components analysis is untenable and, therefore, factor
analysis provides a better fit to the data. Another argument is that if the component
model is truly appropriate then common factor analysis will produce the same solution.
In the current study, PAF was used for structural analysis of the various scales.
Decisions regarding the number of factors to rotate to a final solution were made
using three criteria, the Kaiser criterion (1960), Cattell’s scree plot (1966), and Horn’s
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parallel analysis (1965). The Kaiser criterion, which is the default option in SPSS,
extracts any factor that has an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. Cattell’s scree test is actually
a graphical representation of the eigenvalues presented in order of size. Interpretation of
a scree plot involves identification of the number of factors that occur prior to the
leveling off or scree. Horn’s parallel analysis, now regarded as possibly the best method
for determining the number of factors to extract (Thompson, 2004), compares the actual
eigenvalues generated by the data to eigenvalues of a random data matrix of the same
size. The argument is that any factor producing an eigenvalue greater than the
corresponding random data eigenvalue should be extracted.
Discriminant and convergent validity were examined by exploring the nature of
the relationships among scores on the EBSM, EBI, AGI, TIS, the three revised EBAPS
scenarios, and the endorsement of the six mathematics attitude statements. Initially, a
correlation matrix of these variables was generated and examined for significant
relationships. A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted using the EBSM
score as the dependent variable, first with various demographic variables as independent
variables, followed by analyses with other math related variables, and scores on the EBI
subscales, AGI subscales the TIS as independent variables. ANOVA and MANOVA




There are more than one and less than ten independent dimensions
that are necessary to define an individual’s personal epistemology.
(Pintrich, 2002, p.394)
The purpose of the current chapter is to provide the results of statistical analyses
that addressed the following research questions:
1. Is the Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics (EBSM) a reliable
and valid measure of mathematics related epistemological beliefs?
2. What is the nature of the relationship between contextualized beliefs as
measured by the EBSM and general epistemological beliefs measured by
the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory (EBI)?
3. What is the nature of the relationship between contextualized
epistemological beliefs as measured by the EBSM and achievement goals
as measured by the Achievement Goals Inventory (AGI)?
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4. What is the nature of the relationship between mathematics related
epistemological beliefs as measured by the EBSM and implicit theories of
intelligence as measured by the Theories of Intelligence Scale (TIS)?
The first question was addressed using an iterative process consisting of principal factor
analysis followed by item deletion to assess dimensionality and item functioning. The
identified factors were interpreted using oblique factor rotation. This process was
followed by internal consistency reliability analysis that was used iteratively to identify
and delete items that did not produce sufficient item-total correlations with the scale. To
answer the remaining three research questions, the EBI, AGI, and TIS were each initially
subjected to psychometric analyses to examine the relationship of previously reported
factor structure and internal consistency estimates to those of the current sample.
Specifically, principal factor analysis and principal components analysis followed by
oblique and/or orthogonal rotation was used to examine scale structure. Once the
psychometric properties of the scales were established, multiple regression analysis was
used to regress the factors of the EBSM on scale scores from the EBI, AGI, and TIS as
well as epistemological scenarios and mathematical belief statements.
Structural Analysis of Instruments
The following section details the results of structural analyses of each of the
scales used in the current study. Included are results of principal axis factor analysis and
internal consistency reliability analysis. Also included is a description of the resulting
scales that were formed and used in subsequent analyses.
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Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics (EBSM)
Initially, all 75 items were subjected to factor analysis. The inter-item correlation
matrix was visually inspected and most values were in the low to moderate range.
Statistical assessment of the correlation matrix for factor analysis of the 75 items was
performed using both KMO and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. KMO was equal to .84 and
Bartlett’s Test [χ2 (2775) = 9922.12; p < .001] was significant, indicating that the inter-
item correlation matrix was suitable for factor analysis.
The data were analyzed using principal axis factor analysis (PAF). Three criteria,
the Kaiser criterion, scree plot, and parallel analysis, were used to estimate the number of
factors to extract. There were 19 eigenvalues greater than one that accounted for 67% of
the total variance. The scree plot appeared to support a five factor solution. Parallel
analysis was computed for both PAF and PCA. PAF supported the extraction of 14
factors while PCA supported seven factors. Since a seven factor solution was supported
by the theoretical structure of the scale, seven factors were extracted and obliquely
rotated for interpretation. The first factor represented 20% of the total variance (λ =
14.92) and appeared to be a mixture of elements from several of the hypothetical factors.
In fact, all seven theoretical factors had at least one item loading on the first factor.
These analyses were repeated after removing 17 items that had factor loadings less than
.40 on all factors. The remaining 58 items were subjected to principal factor analysis
followed by oblique rotation. The results were very similar to the first set of analyses.
There were 13 eigenvalues greater than one accounting for 64.3% of the total variance.
The first eigenvalue (λ = 13.77) accounted for 23.7% of the total variance. Once again
the scree plot supported a five factor solution while parallel analysis supported 12 and 7
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factors for PAF and PCA respectively. The presence of a single factor that accounted for
a substantial amount of the total variance led to hypothesis that the data may be
characterized by a general factor.
The data were reanalyzed by applying PAF to each scale individually. An
iterative process was used to refine each theoretical set of items to a uni-dimensional
scale (see Tables 6 through 12). Uni-dimensionality was further evaluated through
reliability analysis. Specifically, item-total correlations were examined and items deleted
when the result was an improvement in coefficient alpha estimates. The following tables
provide factor analytic and reliability information for each of the seven EBSM subscales
that were subjected to higher-order factor analysis.





1. To solve math problems you have to be taught the right
procedure.
.71 .51
2. I learn math best when watching the teacher work example
problems.
.53 .28
3. Math is something I could never learn on my own. .52 .27
4. Learning math depends most on having a good teacher. .45 .20
5. The quality of a math class is determined entirely by the
instructor.
.42 .18
Note: λ = 2.12, 42.4% of total variance represented, α = .65.





1. In math, answers are always either right or wrong. .58 .34
2. Truth is unchanging in mathematics. .58 .34
3. All mathematics professors would probably come up with the
same answers to questions in their field.
.57 .32
4. Creativity has no place in a math class. .46 .21
Note: λ = 1.90, 47.5% of total variance represented, α = .63.
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1. It is a waste of time to work on problems that have no solution. .62 .38
2. I don’t care about why something works, just show me how to
work the problem.
.61 .38
3. Understanding how math is used in other disciplines helps me to
comprehend the concepts.
-.53 .28
4. I like to find different ways to work problems. -.51 .26
Note: λ = 1.96, 49.1% of total variance represented, α = .65. Items with negative
loadings were reverse scored prior to reliability analysis.





1. If I can’t solve a problem quickly, I get frustrated and tend to give up. .63 .39
2. If you can’t solve a problem in a few minutes, you’re not going to solve
it without help.
.62 .38
3. It takes a lot of time to learn math. .54 .29
4. When it comes to math, most students either get it quickly or not at all. .51 .26
5. It is frustrating to read a problem and not know immediately how to
begin to solve it.
.49 .24
6. If you know what you’re doing, you shouldn’t have to spend more than
a few minutes to complete a homework problem.
.48 .23
7. When I encounter a difficult math problem, I stick with it until I solve
it.
-.45 .20
Note: λ = 2.69, 38.4% of total variance represented, α = .73.





1. Math is like a foreign language to me and even if I work hard, I’ll
never really get it.
.86 .74
2. I’m just not a math person. .79 .62
3. If math were easy for me, I wouldn’t have to spend so much time
on homework.
.66 .43
4. It is frustrating when I have to work hard to understand a
problem.
.60 .36
5. I can learn new things, but I can’t really change the math ability I
was born with.
.55 .30
6. I’m confident I could learn difficult material like calculus if I put
in enough effort.
-.54 .29
Note: λ = 3.24, 54.0% of total variance represented, α = .83.
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1. Math ability is really just something you’re born with. .71 .51
2. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change the math
ability you were born with.
.69 .48
3. Most people know at an early age whether they are good at math
or not.
.56 .31
4. The smartest math students don’t have to do many problems
because they just get it.
.56 .31
5. Some people are born with great math ability and some aren’t. .53 .28
Note: λ = 2.49, 49.8% of total variance represented, α = .75.





1. I’m rarely able to use the math I’ve learned in other subjects. -.74 .55
2. I can apply what I learn in mathematics to other subjects. .72 .51
3. It is easy to see the connections between the math I learn in class
and real world applications.
.66 .44
4. Mathematics helps us better understand the world we live in. .65 .42
5. I will rarely use algebra in real life. -.64 .41
6. I need to learn math for my future work. .60 .36
7. Understanding mathematics is important for mathematicians,
economists, and scientists, but not for most people.
-.56 .31
8. Mathematics provides the foundation for most of the principles
used in science and business.
.47 .22
Note: λ = 3.79, 47.4% of total variance represented, α = .84.
The seven scales, representing the seven theoretical factors, were then subjected
to PAF analysis. As in previous analyses, the inter-scale correlation matrix was inspected
and the correlations ranged in absolute magnitude from .32 to .68. All bivariate
correlations were significant at p < .001. KMO was equal to .86 and Bartletts test [χ2 (21)
= 919.47; p < .001] was significant. Both the Kaiser criterion and the scree plot
supported a single factor (λ= 4.023) that accounted for 57.5% of the total variance (see
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Table 13). Factor loadings ranged in magnitude from .63 to .89 and communalities
ranged from .39 to .80.
The hierarchical factor was interpreted as General Beliefs about Learning
Mathematics. The factor can be described in terms of its composite factors as a spectrum
that ranges from a naive or non-availing view (Muis, 2004) characterized as follows:
Math is something you are born with or not. Math is something that can be mastered
quickly if it going to be mastered at all. It has little real–life application for the average
person. Students endorsing this view believe mathematics consists of a set body of
knowledge. In addition, these students view the teacher as the key to mathematics
learning, are generally uninterested in conceptual explanations, and see themselves as
passive recipients in the learning process. Students typically just want to know how to
work the problems. At the opposite end of the spectrum is a more sophisticated or
availing view of learning mathematics. This view is characterized by a belief that hard
work, persistence, and continued practice can improve one’s math skills. These students
are not satisfied with instruction that focuses on mechanics. They prefer big-picture,
conceptual explanations that connect to real-world applications. Although these students
rely on the teacher and see her as a critical component in the learning process, they also
see themselves as active participants.
Table 13: EBSM Second-Order Factor Structure
Scale Factor Loading h2
Leaning is Innate -Personal .89 .80
Speed of Knowledge Acquisition .80 .65
Learning is Innate - General .72 .52
Real World Applicability -.66 .44
Structure of Knowledge -.65 .43
Certainty of Knowledge .63 .39
Source of Knowledge .59 .35
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A scale was constructed that contained the 39 items from the various uni-
dimensional subscales and was subjected to reliability analysis. Items that produced
negative item-scale correlations were reverse scored. The coefficient alpha estimate of
internal consistency was .93. The bivariate correlation between the factor score
generated in PAF analysis and the scale score computed by summing raw scores for each
item was .99. Scale scores were used in subsequent analyses.
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI)
Analysis of the EBI began with a structural analysis of the scale. Visual
inspection of the inter-item correlation matrix revealed a pattern of low to moderate
correlations. Of the 378 unique off-diagonal elements only thirteen correlations exceeded
.04. The vast majority of correlations were in the .01 to .03 range. Statistical assessment
of the correlation matrix for factor analysis of the 28 items was performed using both the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity. KMO was equal to .79 and Bartlett’s Test [χ2 (378) = 2273.20; p < .001] was
significant, indicating that the inter-item correlation matrix was suitable for factor
analysis.
The EBI items were analyzed using principal axis factor analysis (PAF). Three
criteria, the Kaiser criterion, scree plot, and parallel analysis, were used to determine the
number of factors to extract. Although there were eight components with eigenvalues
greater than one, the scree plot suggested a five factor solution, and parallel analysis
indicated that seven factors should be extracted (see Figure 1). Existing theory regarding
the development of the EBI (Scraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002), supports a five factor
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solution. Since the consequences of over-extraction are less severe than under-extraction,
a seven factor solution, which accounted for 57% of the total variance, was initially
explored using oblique rotation for interpretation. Analysis of the structure matrix found
two factors that contained no substantial loadings. The data was reanalyzed, rotating five
factors to final solution using oblique rotation.


















Following oblique rotation using direct oblimin, 27 out of 28 items produced a
factor loading of at least .30. One item, What is true today, will be true tomorrow, failed
to produce a significant loading on any factor. The inter-factor correlations were small,
ranging in absolute magnitude from .02 to .33. The analysis was again repeated using
Varimax rotation. One additional item, Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s big
problems, failed to produce a significant loading under orthogonal rotation. This item
had produced a small loading (.32) under oblique rotation. These two items were deleted
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and the final 26 items were factor analyzed a third time. Only three of the five factors
were interpretable. The first factor was a combination of items theoretically linked to
three different scales. Closer examination of the item distributions revealed that these
items were heavily endorsed by participants thus the first factor appeared to be a
statistical factor based on item distribution similarities. The fifth factor also appears to be
a statistical factor. The four items that formed this factor all had responses very tightly
clustered around the center of the distribution meaning that the scale as a whole was
leptokurtic. Factors 2, 3 and 4, however, appear to be valid factors that are interpretable
and consistent with existing theory (see Table 14). These scales were named, Innate
Ability (λ = 2.56, 9.8% of variance), Simple Knowledge (λ = 2.17, 8.3% of variance),
and Omniscient Authority (λ = 1.66, 6.4% of variance), based on previous theory. The
two factors that failed to emerge in the current analysis, but were documented in the
initial scale development, are Certain Knowledge and Quick Learning. Most of the items
that formed these two scales loaded on Factors 1 or 5.
It is important to note that Schraw et al. (2002) did not fully report the factor
structure of the 28-item EBI. Specifically, three example items were provided for each
factor and unfortunately, one of these items (the largest loading item on Certain
Knowledge factor) was, for unknown reasons, not included in the full-scale. This leaves
14 items not specifically identified with a factor. In the current study these items were
identified with a factor based on previous theory. As a result, it is unclear to what extent
the three interpretable factors reported in the current study replicate factors reported by
Schraw et al. (2002).







Authority Factor 5 h2
1. If you don’t learn something quickly you won’t ever learn it.. .66 .56
2. If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going
back over it won’t help.
.63 .55
3. Some people are born with special gifts and talents. -.61 .58
4. People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth. .55 .51 .56
5. If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them must
be wrong.
.55 .36
6. Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time. .50 .50
7. The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know. -.49 .34
8. Smart people are born that way. .67 .55
9. Students who learn things quickly are the most successful .66 .49
10. Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in
school.
.64 .45
11. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are. .51 .39
12. Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t. .44 .36
13. If a person tries too hard to understand a problem they will most
likely end up being confused.
.66 .52
14. Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories. .53 .49
15. Too many theories just complicates things. .50 .37
16. The best ideas are often the most simple. .49 .35
17. When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it. .61 .43
18. People should always obey the law. .61 .43
19. People shouldn’t question authority. .50 .32
20. Children should be allowed to question their parent’s authority. -.44 .23
21. Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life. .37 .18
22. Absolute moral truth does not exist. -.31 .11
23. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe. .48 .25
24. Most things worth knowing are easy to understand. .43 .46 .45
25. What is true is a matter of opinion. .39 .16
26. Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts. .32 .15
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Scales were formed from the items that loaded on the three factors, Innate Ability,
Omniscient Authority, and Simple Knowledge, and these scales were then subjected to
reliability analysis. The coefficient alpha estimate for the five items that formed the
Innate Ability scale was .75. One item associated with the Omniscient Authority scale,
Absolute moral truth does not exist, produced low item-total correlations and was deleted
from the scale. The resulting 5 item scale had an internal consistency reliability estimate
of .61. The four-item, Simple Knowledge scale produced a coefficient alpha estimate of
.66. These values are very similar to those reported in previous research (Schraw et al.,
2002).
Achievement Goals Inventory (AGI)
Analysis of the AGI began with a structural analysis of the scale. Initial
inspection of the bivariate correlations for the 18-item AGI revealed a pattern of
correlations ranging from small to large with the majority in the moderate range.
Examination of the frequency distributions for the items revealed three items that
comprise the Outcome Goal scale were heavily endorsed by students, creating an
extremely skewed scale distribution. Statistical assessment of the correlation matrix for
factor analysis of the 18 items was performed using both the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. Bartlett’s Test [χ2 (153) =
3598.7; p < .001] was significant and KMO was equal to .89, indicating that the inter-
item correlation matrix was suitable for factor analysis. The data was analyzed using
both principal axis factor analysis (PAF) and principal components analysis (PCA) and
three criteria were used to determine the number of factors to extract; the Kaiser criterion,
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Scree Plot, and parallel analysis (see Figure 2). Both the Kaiser criterion and the scree
plot converged on a three factor solution. Parallel analysis, however, seemed to suggest
that a four factor solution might be more appropriate.





















The statistical procedures documented by Grant and Dweck (2003) were repeated
with the current sample for comparative purposes. Specifically, four factors were
extracted using PCA, followed by varimax rotation. The result was an identical factor
solution to that reported by Grant and Dweck (2003). In addition, the percentage of total
variance explained was 72%, identical to that previously reported. Factor loadings were
similar in magnitude and one item crossloaded on the same two scales in both samples.
Since the inter-factor correlations reported by Grant and Dweck (2003) were
substantial, ranging from .17 to .53 and because of the tendency for the Little Jiffy
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(Gorsuch, 1883), PCA with varimax rotation, to impose structure on even random data,
additional analyses were conducted using PAF and oblique rotation to explore alternative
factor solutions. Four factors were extracted that accounted for 72% of the total variance.
The factor structure was basically similar to the PCA solution reported by Grant and
Dweck (2003), however, the inter-factor correlations were substantial, ranging in
absolute magnitude from .10 to .52, suggesting the presence of a higher order factor. A
second order factor analysis was conducted using the factor scores from the first order
factors as variables. Two factors were extracted that accounted for 78.1% of the total
variance. The factors were obliquely rotated to a final solution (see Table 16).
Two scales were formed from the items that comprised the higher-order factors
and subjected to reliability analysis. The first scale consisted of 15 items from the Ability
Goals, Normative Outcome Goals, Learning Goals, and Outcome Goals factors. All of
the items that comprise the first-order factors pertained to various aspects of course
performance and therefore, the second-order factor was named Course Outcome Goals.
Outcome goals assess the importance of getting good grades and doing well in class.
Ability goals emphasize the confirmation of intelligence through course performance.
Learning Goals reflect value in the learning process. The Normative Goals items, which
formed a single factor under PCA with orthogonal rotation (Grant & Dweck, 2003), split
into two factors under PAF analysis. Normative Outcome Goals combined with Ability
Goals to form the first factor, although all three items cross loaded with the three items
that formed the Normative Ability factor. Normative outcome goals focus on course
performance in comparison to others while Normative Ability goals emphasize validating
intelligence through comparison with others. The second higher order factor was formed
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from the three items related to Normative Ability and, therefore, retained this name (see
Table 16). Coefficient alpha internal consistency estimates for the two scales were .90
and .94 for Course Outcome and Normative Ability scales respectively.
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One of my important goals is to
validate my intelligence through
my schoolwork.
.84 -.45 .71
In school I am focused on
demonstrating my intellectual
ability.
.77 -.40 .40 .43 .61
A major goal I have in my courses is
to get higher grades than the
other students.
.72 -.72 .71
It is very important to me to do well
in my courses compared to
others.
.65 -.52 .49 .54




I try to do better in my classes than
other students.
.59 -.52 .41 .46
When I take a course in school it is
very important for me to validate
that I am smarter than other
students.
.42 -.94 .88
It is very important to me to confirm
that I am more intelligent than
other students.
.45 -.88 .78
In school I am focused on
demonstrating that I am smarter
than other students.
.42 -.87 .78
I really enjoy facing challenges, and I
seek out opportunities to do so in
my courses.
.40 .81 .68
I seek out courses that I will find
challenging
.76 .60
In school I am always seeking
opportunities to develop new
skills and acquire knowledge.
.46 .76 .43 .63
It is very important to me to feel that
my coursework offers me real
challenges.
.75 .57
In my classes I focus on developing
my abilities and acquiring new
ones.
.45 .74 .53 .64
A major goal I have in my courses is
to perform really well.
.59 .85 .75
I really want to get good grades in
my classes
.42 .82 .68
It is very important for me to do well
in my courses.
.72 .52
I strive to constantly learn and
improve in my courses.
.53 .62 .64 .63
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Ability and Normative Outcome Goals .82
Normative Ability Goals .81 -.73
Learning Goals .51
Outome Goals .73
Note: Inter-factor correlation, r = -.37.
Theories of Intelligence Scale (TIS)
Analysis of the TIS began with structural analysis. Initial inspection of the inter-
item correlations revealed moderate to large correlations ranging from .27 to .71.
Bartlett’s test [χ2 (28) = 1262.4; p < .001] was highly significant and the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) was .87, indicating that the items were
sufficiently related to warrant factor analysis. The data was analyzed using both principal
axis factor analysis (PAF) and principal components analysis (PCA) and three criteria
were used to determine the number of factors to extract; the Kaiser criterion, scree plot,
and parallel analysis. All three criteria seemed to converge on a two factor solution.
There were two eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and both the scree plot and parallel analysis
supported the extraction of two factors (see Figure 3). Two factors were extracted that
represented 70% of the total variance and obliquely rotated using direct oblimin. The
two factors were highly correlated (r = -.67). One factor represented the negatively
worded items and the other positively worded items.
Since previous research found this scale to be uni-dimensional (Dweck, Chiu, &
Hong, 1995), the data were reanalyzed to force a single factor to be extracted. The one
factor solution accounted for approximately 57% of the total variance. All eight items
produced strong factor loadings ranging in magnitude from .59 to .80. Communalities
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ranged from .35 to .64 (see Table 17). Interestingly, parallel analysis produced using
PCA supports a one-factor solution and produced similar factor loadings and
communalities to the PAF solution (see Figure 4).

















































1. You can change even your basic intelligence level
considerably.
.80 .64
2. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your
basic intelligence.
-.78 .61
3. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your
intelligence level.
.75 .57
4. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are. .71 .50
5. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always
change it quite a bit.
.70 .49
6. Your intelligence is something about you that can’t change
very much.
-.69 .47
7. To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you
are.
-.66 .43
8. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t
really do much to change it.
-.59 .35
Once the uni-dimensionality of the scale was established, the negative loading
items were reverse scored prior to reliability analysis. Coefficient alpha internal
consistency reliability estimate was equal to .89. Both the factor structure and reliability
estimates are very similar to those reported in previous studies (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong,
1995).
Construct Validity of the EBSM
Construct validity of the EBSM was explored through the analysis of
relationships with demographic variables including age, gender, and academic
classification, student’s mathematical experience, endorsement of math related attitude
statements, and through the analysis of relationships with other constructs including
scores on the EBI, AGI and TIS.
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Following structural analysis of the EBSM, EBI, AGI and TIS, scales were
formed by summing the items associated with each substantive factor. Various scale
characteristics including means, standard deviations, and coefficient alpha internal
consistency estimates are presented in Table 18.
Table 18: Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-scale correlations
Scale X s EBSM EBI-I EBI-S EBI-A AGI-CP AGI-NA TIS
EBSM 137.0 24.0 .93
EBI – Innate 17.1 4.1 .53* .75
EBI – Simple 14.6 3.0 .57* .39* .66
EBI – Authority 19.6 3.5 .11 .15* .16* .61
AGI – Course
Performance
65.4 10.1 -.07 .04 .03 .30* .90
AGI – Normative
Ability
9.6 3.4 .07 .30* .15* .17* .42* .94
TIS 33.1 6.5 -.35* -.56* -.27* .09 .17* -.25* .89
Note: Internal consistency estimates on main diagonal, * p<.01.
Demographic and Mathematics Variables
As described in Chapter II, epistemological beliefs have been linked to particular
demographic variables. To test the assumption that mathematics related epistemological
beliefs, as measured by the EBSM, varied demographically, EBSM scores were regressed
on age, gender, and academic classification. The result was a statistically significant
relationship (F(3,265) = 4.369, p = .005) with little practical significance, however, as
only 5% of the variance in EBSM was accounted for by these demographic variables.
Academic classification was the only significant predictor. The results seem to indicate
that upperclassmen are more likely to endorse availing beliefs while underclassmen are
more likely to endorse naïve beliefs.
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Participants were provided a series of six statements that reflect commonly voiced
mathematics experiences. The statements ranged from positive to negative (see
Appendix F). EBSM scores were regressed on the six statements and the result was a
highly significant relationship (F(6,266) = 25.087, p < .001) that accounted for 36% of
the variance in EBSM scores with all six statements producing statistically significant
regression coefficients. As predicted, the three negative statements produced positive
regression coefficients and the reverse was true for the three positive statements. This
indicates that higher scores on the EBSM (representing a naïve epistemology) are
associated with more negative attitudes toward mathematics and lower scores (associated
with an availing or more sophisticated epistemology) are related to positive attitudes.
Participants responded to three contextualized scenarios that measured various
aspects of mathematical beliefs. EBSM scores were regressed on the three scenario
scores and the result was highly significant (F(2,2270) = 40.487, p < .001) and accounted
for 32% of the variance in EBSM scores. Only the first two scenarios, which measured
Structure of Knowledge and Innate Ability, proved to be useful predictors. The third
scenario was extremely skewed, as the vast majority of participants responded similarly.
Once again, an availing epistemology was associated with lower EBSM scores and a
naïve view was associated with higher scores.
Participants were asked to provide the number of mathematics courses completed
in high school or college. This variable was to function as a proxy for mathematical
competency. When EBSM scores were regressed on the number of courses completed
the result was (F(1,270) = 31.678, p < .001) and indicated the proportion of variance
shared between these variables was 11%. The regression coefficient was negative
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indicating that more sophisticated or availing mathematics beliefs are associated with
students who have completed more mathematics courses. This relationship may have
been attenuated based on the observation that a large number of participants had
completed a basic, three course algebra sequence.
Domain Specificity
It was hypothesized that students with majors in different quadrants of the Biglan
(1973a) classification system would differ in their mathematics beliefs. Only the
community college sample (n = 186) was used in this analysis because the university
sample was not balanced across domains. The vast majority of university participants
included education or business majors and were classified in a single quadrant, soft-
applied, of the Biglan scheme.
A two (pure-applied) by two (hard-soft) between-subjects factorial ANOVA was
used to assess mean differences in EBSM scores. Neither the interaction (F(1, 156) =
2.987, p = .09), nor the main effects (FPure/Applied(1,156) = 2.631, p = .11 and
FHard/Soft(1,156) = 1.537, p = .22) were significant. It was hypothesized that perhaps mean
differences among community college students are not as pronounced as they may be for
upperclassmen and graduate students. Community college students are engaged in
general education curriculum and have not experienced more focused upper division
coursework in a declared major.
In order to examine more subtle mean differences, a factorial MANOVA was
employed to assess mean differences on the seven uni-dimensional scales rather than the
full EBSM scale. As was the case in the previous analysis, there was no significant
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interaction (λ (7, 150) = .951, p = .367). The main effect for the pure-applied dimension
was also not statistically significant (λ (7, 150) = .954, p = .415). The main effect for the
hard-soft dimension was statistically significant (λ (7, 150) = .880, p = .007) and
produced a partial eta2 equal to .12. Follow-up univariate tests indicated that two
variables, Real World Applicability (F(1, 156) = 9.464, p = .002, partial eta2 = .06) and
Innate Ability-General (F(1, 156) = 3.952, p = .049, partial eta2 = .03) had statistically
significant mean differences. Specifically, students with academic majors classified as
hard ( X = 31.9) were more likely to see the applicability of mathematical education than
those with soft ( X = 29.5) majors. Interestingly, the students majoring in hard ( X =
18.5) areas were also slightly more likely to endorse a naïve view of innate ability than
those majoring in soft ( X = 18.1) areas.
General Epistemological Beliefs
The relationship among various dimensions of general epistemological beliefs and
math specific beliefs was assessed by regressing EBSM scores on the three EBI subscale
scores. The result was a highly significant relationship (F(3, 258) = 64.77, p < .001) that
accounted for 43% of the EBSM score variance. The Innate Ability and Simple
Knowledge scales proved to be significant predictors while Omniscient Authority was
not. It did not appear that multicollinearity was responsible for the lack of relationship
between the Omniscient Authority and EBSM scores, as the Omniscient Authority scale
was not highly correlated with either the Innate Ability (r = .15) or the Simple
Knowledge (r = .16) scales. A scatterplot of the two variables, EBSM and EBI-
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Authority, revealed a random pattern indicating no significant relationship between the
two variables.
Bivariate correlations were computed for corresponding EBI and EBSM scales.
The EBI Innate Ability scale produced a significant correlation with both the EBSM
Innate-Personal (r = .46, p < .01) and General (r = .65, p < .01) scales. The correlation
between EBI Simple and EBSM Structure scales was .49 (p < .01) and the correlation
between EBI and EBSM authority scales was .24 (p < .01).
Achievement Goals and Theories of Intelligence
The relationship among achievement goals, theories of intelligence, and math
beliefs was assessed by regressing EBSM scores onto the AGI subscale scores and the
TIS scores. The result of regressing the EBSM on two subscales of the AGI, Course
Performance and Learning- Ability, was not statistically significant (F(2, 260) = 2.015), p
= .135) and accounted for a mere 1.5% of the variance. The result of the regression of
EBSM scores on TIS scores was significant (F(1, 264) = 36.73, p < .001) and accounted
for 12% of the total variance. The Innate Ability dimension of general epistemological
measures is based on implicit theories of intelligence. To assess the nature of this
relationship in the current study, the bivariate correlations between the TIS and EBSM
subscales, Innate Ability-Personal and Innate Ability-General were computed. The
results indicate that the TIS is significantly related to both the EBSM Innate Abiltiy
Personal (r = -.32, p < .01) and EBSM Innate Ability-General (r =-.49, p < .01) scales.
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Summary
The first research question sought to assess the reliability and validity of the
EBSM. Item level factor analysis of the EBSM indicated that the data might be
characterized by a general factor. Subsequent analysis was conducted by submitting
seven uni-dimensional scales to PAF analysis. The result was a single higher order
factor. The internal consistency reliability estimate for the items that comprised this
general epistemological factor was .93. The construct validity of the EBSM was
evaluated through regression analysis. The EBSM scores were regressed onto a number
of variables that represent a range of mathematics attitudes, beliefs, and experience.
Statistically significant results that supported hypothesized relationships were
documented. Initial results indicate that the EBSM is a reliable and valid measure of
mathematics related epistemological beliefs.
Analysis of mean differences based on demographic variables was conducted and
both gender and age seemed to be generally unrelated to epistemological beliefs while
academic classification has a small, but statistically significant relationship with beliefs.
Mean differences based on academic major were analyzed using both univariate ANOVA
and MANOVA. Results indicate that differences exist between hard and soft majors but
not pure and applied. The Real World Applicability and Innate Ability-General
subscales appeared to be primarily responsible for the mean differences.
The second research question sought to assess the relationship among
mathematics beliefs as measured by the EBSM and general epistemological beliefs
measured by the EBI. EBSM scores were regressed onto the three EBI subscale scores
and a statistically significant relationship emerged. In addition, bivariate correlations
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among the three EBI subscales and corresponding EBSM subscales were examined. The
results indicated a significant relationship between EBI Innate Ability and both EBSM
Innate Personal and Innate General scales. There was also a significant relationship
between the EBI Simple Knowledge and EBSM Structure of Knowledge scales. No
significant relationship was found between the EBI Omniscient Authority and EBSM
Source of Knowledge scales.
The third research question sought to address the relationship among mathematics
beliefs and achievement goals as measured by the AGI. The structure of the AGI was
first analyzed using PAF analysis and oblique rotation. The four first order factors were
significantly correlated leading to higher order factor analysis. Two higher order factors
emerged and were named, Course Performance and Learning Ability, and produced
internal consistency reliability estimates of .90 and .94 respectively. No statistically
significant relationship was found when EBSM scores were regressed onto the subscales
of the AGI.
The fourth research question sought to address the relationship between
mathematics beliefs and implicit theories of intelligence as measured by the TIS. The
structure of the TIS was first analyzed using PAF analysis. The result confirmed
previous research regarding the uni-dimensionality of the TIS. The coefficient alpha
estimate of internal consistency was .89. The EBSM was regressed on the TIS and a
statistically significant relationship was found. Bivariate correlations among the EBSM,
AGI, and TIS indicate that implicit theories of intelligence are related to both




The important thing to note here is that the investigator is not
finished once the scale is developed. There is always more to know . . .
Andrew Comrey
The purpose of the current study was to assess the psychometric properties of a
scale developed to measure mathematics related epistemological beliefs. Factor analysis
revealed that this construct may differ in structure from general measures of
epistemological beliefs, and specifically the EBI. General epistemological beliefs have
been found to be multidimensional (Jehng et al., 1993; Schommer, 1990; Wood &
Kardash, 2002), although the exact nature of the dimensions has not converged in number
or form. In contrast, the various theoretical dimensions of the EBSM were highly
correlated and it appears that this construct is best represented by a hierarchical factor
structure.
The EBSM was found to be related in expected ways to a number of mathematics
related variables including, the number of mathematics courses completed in high school
and/or college, endorsement of any number of six common mathematics attitude
statements, and responses to contextualized epistemological beliefs scenarios. In spite of
the structural differences between the general measure of epistemological beliefs
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and the EBSM, the two constructs were highly correlated. Participants’ EBSM scores
were found to be moderately related to personal theories of intelligence but were not
significantly related to achievement goals. The following discussion addresses each of
the stated research questions, followed by limitations of the current study, and finally,
implications for further research, theory, and practice.
Structure, Reliability and Validity of the EBSM
The initial item pool for the EBSM was comprised of 75 items corresponding to
seven hypothesized dimensions; Source of Knowledge, Certainty of Knowledge,
Structure of Knowledge, Speed of Knowledge Acquisition, Innate Ability – Personal,
Innate Ability – General, and Real-world Applicability. The first research question
asked: Is the EBSM a reliable and valid measure of mathematics related epistemological
beliefs? This question was addressed through an iterative process of factor analysis and
item deletion. The results of PAF analysis with the full 75 items resulted in a large first
factor that accounted for nearly 24% of the total variance and was characterized by items
from all seven hypothesized dimensions. To better understand the psychometric
dynamics of the scale, items for each of the hypothesized dimensions were analyzed
separately. Uni-dimensional scales were formed through an iterative process involving
PAF analysis, internal consistency reliability analysis, and item deletion. The seven uni-
dimensional scales were then subjected to PAF analysis and the result was a single factor
that accounted for nearly 58% of the total variance. The 39 items that comprised this
scale produced an internal consistency reliability coefficient of .93.
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The emergence of highly correlated scales that ultimately produced a single
higher-order factor was certainly an unexpected, although not unprecedented result. It is
unclear to what extent students’ general attitudes about mathematics may have masked
the more subtle distinctions among items across dimensions. A similar result was
reported previously (Buehl et al., 2002) during the development of a domain specific
instrument that assessed beliefs about mathematics and history. All mathematics related
items loaded on a single factor as did all history-based beliefs. Hofer (1999) also found
support for a one-dimensional mathematics beliefs scale. Two factors initially emerged
when six items were subjected to EFA and orthogonal rotation. The items were
subsequently combined into a single scale based on internal consistency reliability
analysis. Hofer (1999) indicated that the scale seemed to measure “acceptance of typical,
relatively unsophisticated views about the nature of mathematics” (p. 77). In the present
study this naïve view could be characterized as follows: Students view mathematics as a
collection of mechanical skills, learned passively from a teacher, with little application to
their everyday lives. At the opposite end of the continuum is a more sophisticated or
availing view of mathematics, characterized by a belief that the student is an active
participant in the learning process and hard work and persistence can improve one’s math
ability. These students frequently prefer conceptual explanations that link concepts to
real-world applications.
The EBSM appears to be a consistent measure of mathematics related beliefs
based on reliability analysis. The coefficient alpha estimate for the EBSM exceeds
reliability estimates reported in previous studies of both general and domain specific
instruments. Internal consistency reliability estimates on general measures of personal
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epistemology are somewhat inconsistent and typically range from .45 to .70. Hofer
(1999) reported a coefficient alpha estimate of .54 on a six-item math beliefs scale and
Buehl et al. (2002) reported alpha estimates of .84 for each of two parallel forms of the
22-item mathematics portion of the Preliminary-Domain Specific Beliefs Questionnaire
(P-DSBQ). One might argue that the larger number of items (n = 39) comprising the
EBSM may have contributed to a larger internal consistency estimate. It should be noted,
however, that even the smaller set of 24 items that comprised the first factor during the
initial factor analysis, also produced a coefficient alpha estimate equal to .93.
It was hypothesized that students would be able to respond more consistently to
domain specific items than to general epistemological beliefs items. This hypothesis
appears to be supported in the current study. General measures of personal epistemology
have been plagued by structural and psychometric inconsistency. General
epistemological measures typically contain items that are difficult to answer devoid of
context (e.g. What is true today will be true tomorrow or What is true is a matter of
opinion). Elby and Hammer (2001) questioned that students could meaningfully and
consistently respond to such general items. They suggested that items must be
contextualized to elicit a meaningful response. In the current study, items were written
that are specific to the learning and teaching of mathematics. Initial results indicate that
students were able to respond more consistently to the mathematics items than the
general items.
Differences in EBSM scores based on various demographic characteristics were
examined via regression analysis. The result was statistically significant, but only a small
proportion of the variance (5%) was accounted for. Gender and age appeared to be
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unrelated to EBSM scores. Although reports of differences based on gender have been
inconsistent, a number of studies have found no gender related effects on general
measures of personal epistemology (Buehl et al., 2002; Chan & Elliott, 2002; Chan,
2003). A more consistent pattern of differences is documented with respect to age. The
differences appear to be factor specific, however, with most researchers noting age
differences on the innate ability factor (Bendixen et al., 1994; Paulsen & Wells, 1998;
Schommer, 1998) and one study noting differences on the Authority/Expert Knowledge
factor (Chan, 2003). One explanation for the findings in the current study may be found
in the age distribution of participants. Although the age range of participants was 18 to
55 years, the distribution was extremely positively skewed with a mean participant age of
25 years. Studies with a restricted age range tend to produce less consistent results with
respect to the relationship between age and epistemological beliefs. The fact that the data
is the present study was clustered in the low 20s may have prevented the detection of
differences with regard to age.
Academic classification (i.e. freshman, sophomore, etc.) was found to have a
statistically significant relationship to EBSM scores with upperclassmen and graduate
students endorsing more sophisticated beliefs than underclassmen. Similar findings have
been documented in previous studies. Academic experience has consistently been
associated with epistemological beliefs in high school (Schommer et al., 1997), collegiate
(Jehng et al., 1993; Schommer, 1993b), and adult (Schommer, 1998) samples. As in the
current study, higher levels of education were associated with more sophisticated
epistemological beliefs. It is unclear whether longer exposure to educational experiences
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influences one’s beliefs, whether persons with more sophisticated beliefs are more likely
to continue to engage in educational processes, or whether the two work synergistically.
It should be noted that the results of analyses using academic classification could
be confounded with the effects of academic major. Upperclassmen in the current sample
were generally university students who were primarily enrolled in education and business
programs. As discussed in a subsequent section, education and business majors, both
classified as soft disciplines in Biglan’s scheme, have been associated with more
sophisticated epistemological beliefs (Paulsen & Wells, 1998) and hard disciplines such
as physics or engineering. The results of statistical differences based on academic
classification should, therefore, be interpreted with caution.
Construct validity for the EBSM was evaluated in three ways. Participants were
asked to endorse any number of six statements commonly expressed by students with
regard to mathematics. The statements ranged from positive, Math has always been easy
for me, to negative, I have never had good experiences in a math class. Participants were
also asked to provide information regarding the number of mathematics classes they had
taken during high school and college. This variable was to serve as a proxy for
mathematics ability. Participants were also asked to respond to three brief scenarios that
measured epistemological beliefs in the context of a typical learning situation. All three
variables were significantly related in expected ways to EBSM scores. Specifically,
students who endorsed more negative attitude statements, took fewer math courses in
high school or college, and endorsed naïve beliefs on the contextualized scenarios also
had more naïve mathematics related epistemological beliefs. These results indicate that
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EBSM scores are related to students’ attitudes about math and math experiences lending
validity to the construct.
Domain specificity was analyzed using the Biglan (1973a, 1973b) classification
system to organize academic majors across two domains, pure-applied and hard-soft.
Neither the interaction effect nor the main effects were significant when using the total
EBSM score as the dependent variable. Further analyses were conducted using the seven
uni-dimensional scales as the dependent variables in a factorial MANOVA design. As
before, there was no significant interaction, but unlike previous results the main effect for
the hard-soft dimension was statistically significant. Univariate tests revealed that the
source of the mean differences were the Real-World Applicability scale and the Innate
Ability-General scale. Jehng et al. (1993) also found significant epistemological
differences across a hard-soft classification system; with students in soft fields reflecting
more sophisticated beliefs on three dimensions, Certainty, Structure, and Authority.
There were, however, some differences between the system used by Jehng et al. and
Biglan’s system. For example, only four academic fields (i.e. engineering, business,
arts/humanities, and social science) were studied and business majors were classified as
hard while Biglan (1973a) classifies business majors as soft. Paulsen and Wells (1998)
found significant differences across both the hard-soft and pure-applied dimensions using
a series of univariate ANOVAs. Specifically, mean scores were higher (i.e. less
sophisticated) on Certain Knowledge, Simple Knowledge, and Quick Learning scales in
the applied fields and scores were also higher on Certain Knowledge in the hard
domains. In the current study, although students in hard domains were able to more
clearly see real-world applicability of mathematics, they were more likely to take a naïve
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view of innate ability. Perhaps students in hard fields have always found mathematics
relatively easy leading to their adoption of a more naïve perspective. If these same
students were to complete an epistemological survey specific to a discipline like foreign
language or literature would their responses change?
Although additional research is needed, the hard-soft dimension may best
distinguish group differences. In Biglan’s (1973a) initial study, the hard-soft dimension
accounted for more variance among groups than the other two dimensions. Subsequent
research has confirmed the explanatory power of the hard-soft dimension (Donald, 1990;
Malaney, 1986). Donald (1990) documented that faculty differences in knowledge
validation criteria were accounted for only by the hard-soft dimension and Malaney
(1986) found the hard-soft dimension accounted for more than 60% of the variance
among graduate students in a discriminant analysis. Donald (1990) concluded that
perhaps the first dimension of Biglan’s model best characterizes domain differences
similar to The Two Cultures observed by Snow (1964).
Relationship to Other Constructs
The relationship of the EBSM to various constructs including general
epistemological beliefs, achievement goals, and implicit theories of intelligence was
explored through regression analyses. The results of these analyses provides evidence for
convergent and discriminant validity of the EBSM. These results are detailed in the
following section.
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Relationship of EBSM to EBI
The second research question, What is the nature of the relationship between
mathematics beliefs measured by the EBSM and more general epistemological beliefs
measured by the EBI?, was first addressed through a structural analysis of the Epistemic
Beliefs Inventory (EBI). Procedures similar to those described in previous studies
(Schraw et al., 2002; Huglin, 2003) were followed with somewhat similar results. The
current study replicated only three of the five factors documented in the initial validation
study, namely Innate Ability, Simple Knowledge, and Omniscient Authority. Internal
consistency reliability estimates in the current study ranged from .61 to .75, similar to
estimates reported by Schraw et al. (2002). One unpublished validation study of the EBI
(Huglin, 2003) reported somewhat lower coefficient alpha estimates on the three EBI
factors interpreted in the current study. It seems that the measure of general
epistemological beliefs continues to produce psychometric inconsistencies. One
contribution of the current study is the documentation that some items tend to be over-
endorsed. These consensus items formed a single factor that was not interpretable. It
seems that these items should be revised and or replaced in subsequent studies using the
EBI.
To evaluate the relationship between general epistemological beliefs and math
specific beliefs, the EBSM scores were regressed on the three EBI scale scores and the
result was statistically significant. Specifically, the analysis indicated that EBI scales
accounted for approximately 43% of the variance in EBSM scores. These results indicate
that there is considerable overlap between general epistemological beliefs and
mathematics specific beliefs.
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Bivariate correlations between corresponding scales of the EBI and EBSM ranged
from .24 to .65 indicating that these scales measure related but not redundant constructs.
The strongest correlation was between the EBI Innate Ability scale and the EBSM
Innate-General scale. Shared variance between these scales was approximately 42%.
Examination of specific items from these scales reveals an epistemological belief that to
some extent transcends a specific academic domain. For example, the two largest
loading items on the EBI Innate Ability and the EBSM Innate-General scales were, Smart
people are born that way and Math ability is really just something you’re born with,
respectively. One would intuitively expect similarities in student responses to these items
The EBI Simple Knowledge and EBSM Structure scales share a moderate amount
of variance (24%). Items representing the EBSM Structure factor have a distinct focus
on a desire for conceptual understanding rather than computational efficiency. This
factor distinguishes students who seek to understand why from those who just want to
know how. The EBI Simple Knowledge factor is much more general, characterized by
items such as, If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely
end up being confused and Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.
The weakest observed relationship was between the Authority scales of the EBI
and EBSM (r2 = .06). It is possible that these two scales assess different constructs. The
EBI Authority scale includes statements regarding authority in general. For example,
People shouldn’t question authority and People should always obey the law.
Alternatively, the EBSM Authority scale focuses on the role of the teacher. This scale
includes statements such as: To solve math problems you have to be taught the right
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procedure. Beliefs about the role of the teacher may be independent of one’s general
view of authority.
Relationship of EBSM to AGI
The third research question, What is the nature of the relationship between
mathematics beliefs measured by the EBSM and achievement goals?, was initially
addressed through structural analysis of the Achievement Goals Inventory (AGI).
Although PCA and varimax rotation produced identical factor structure to that reported
by Grant and Dweck (2003), Gorshuch’s (1983) warnings about this procedure led to the
use of principal axis factor analysis and oblique rotation in the current study. The inter-
factor correlations following oblique rotation were substantial and lead to higher order
factor analysis. Two correlated higher order factors were formed, the first labeled Course
Outcome Goals (α = .90) and the second, Normative Ability Goals (α = .94). 
Dweck (2000) initially conceptualized learning and performance goals as a uni-
dimensional construct. She indicated that students will tend to endorse both learning and
ability goals in benign situations. The distinction is manifest only under situations of
forced choice or when students are observed in learning situations that challenge their
knowledge or skills. For reasons just stated, students may have endorsed both learning
and ability goals in the present study contributing to substantial inter-factor correlation.
EBSM scores were regressed on the AGI subscale scores and the result was not
statistically significant. Bivariate correlations among AGI scale scores and EBI scale
scores were negligible, ranging from .03 to .30. Epistemological beliefs appear to
represent a construct distinct from achievement goals. This is an interesting finding as
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both constructs are based in part on implicit theories of intelligence. The implications of
this finding are explored further in the following section.
Relationship of EBSM to TIS
The fourth research question, What is the nature of the relationship between
mathematics beliefs measured by the EBSM and implicit theories of intelligence?, was
first addressed through structural analysis of the Theories of Intelligence Scale (TIS).
Structural analysis of the TIS resulted in a unidimensional scale that produced an internal
consistency reliability estimate of .89. The foundation of the general epistemological
factor, Innate Ability, which is included in general epistemological beliefs measures and
included as part of the hypothesized structure of the EBSM, is found in research
regarding fixed and malleable beliefs about intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). It
seems intuitive to assume that these constructs would be related, although a recent study
designed to test this hypothesis found a moderate relationship between the Innate Ability
factor of a measure of general epistemological beliefs and theories of intelligence (r = .26
for fixed intelligence and r = -.34 for malleable intelligence). The results of the current
study produced similar results. A moderate correlation was found between the TIS and
the EBSM (r = -.35, p < .01), indicating that more naïve mathematics related beliefs were
associated with a fixed view of intelligence. When the relationship between the EBSM
subscales relating to Innate Ability and the TIS was examined the result was a
substantially stronger relationship particularly between the general form of the EBSM
Innate Ability scale (r = -.49, p < .01).
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Interestingly, although both epistemological beliefs and achievement goals are
related to implicit theories of intelligence, they are unrelated to each other, each
seemingly tapping an independent portion of the implicit theories construct. These
observations prompt a number of currently unanswered questions including the
following: Is one’s theory of intelligence an antecedent to both one’s epistemological
beliefs and one’s adoption of particular achievement goals? What is the nature of the
relationship of all three constructs to academic outcome variables like achievement?
Would an intervention directed at changing student’s fixed beliefs to malleable ones
(Dweck, 2000) ultimately influence both achievement goals and epistemological beliefs?
These questions warrant further research to explore the nature of the relationship among
these constructs.
Limitations
The results of the current study may be subject to the following limitations: First,
the sample was non-random and may not be representative of the population. The sample
was predominately white (67%) and female (70%) and these sample characteristics
should be considered when interpreting the findings of the current study.
Second, only the community college sample could be used when analyzing mean
differences based on Biglan’s classification system. Nearly 80% of the university sample
included education or business majors. Both of these fields are classified as soft-applied
in the Biglan scheme, rendering group comparisons dubious. In addition, domain
differences may have been masked in the community college sample, in that students are
not yet fully engaged in courses in their major field of study. Community college
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coursework consists primarily of general education courses. Domain differences may be
more pronounced in samples including upper division and graduate students.
Third, the instrument was quite lengthy and completion required 40 to 45 minutes
for most participants. Fatigue may have been a factor and a shorter version of the
instrument will be used in subsequent studies. The length of the instrument may have
affected responses on the EBI, AGI and or TIS as these items were delivered in random
order after the EBSM items.
Fourth, although feedback regarding content validity was solicited from
mathematics education specialists, none was returned. It is unclear to what extent the
items could have been improved based on requested feedback.
Fifth, mathematics ability was assessed using the number of mathematics courses
taken in high school or college as a proxy variable. It is unclear to what extent this
variable is able to approximate mathematics ability. The distribution for this variable was
leptokurtic, as a large number of participants had taken the basic algebra sequence
including college algebra leading to a severely peaked distribution. Applying a
transformation (e.g. a square root transformation) to the data may improve the validity of
statistical analyses using this variable. A measure of mathematical thinking or problem
solving may produce more meaningful results.
Sixth, the sample size was not large enough to allow for cross validation of
results. Additional research will be needed to validate the results of the current study.
And finally, factor analytic results are inherently subjective in nature, as the numerous
decisions regarding factor extraction, rotation, and interpretation can lead to different
outcomes.
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Implications for Further Research
The results of the current study have generated a number of recommendations for
further research. First, previous research (Buehl et al., 2002) found that confirmatory and
exploratory factor analytic techniques produced different structural interpretations of the
construct. In light of these results, confirmatory factor analysis should be used in
subsequent validation studies. Specifically, a series of nested models can be compared
and model fit analyzed. Second, if the uni-dimensional nature of the EBSM remains
stable then the construct is a candidate for analysis via Item Response Theory. Rasch
analysis of the scale may assist with further item refinement and scale development.
Early indications are that a shorter, version of the instrument produced equivalent internal
consistency reliability estimates and should be tested in subsequent studies. Third,
predictive validity should be explored using an established measure of mathematical
reasoning or problem solving. Fourth, structural equation modeling techniques should be
used to explore a number of issues that emerged in the current study including, the
synergistic relationship between exposure to education and epistemological beliefs,
further exploration of the finding that the AGI and EBSM seem to tap independent
portions of implicit theories of intelligence as measured by the TIS, and finally, a pre-
post test design with an intervention directed at eliciting more sophisticated
epistemological beliefs. Finally, the measure of general epistemological beliefs used in
the current study did not prove to be a psychometrically sound measure of the construct.
Item refinement and perhaps additional item construction followed by psychometric and
structural analyses need to continue. In addition, further structural analysis of the AGI is
warranted. The emergence of a higher order factor in the current study has not been
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previously explored in achievement goal literature. This may open the door to new
interpretations of this construct.
Implications for Theory and Practice
There is currently no comprehensive theoretical model of mathematics beliefs.
The basis for the development of the EBSM was common themes that emerged in
mathematics beliefs and general epistemological beliefs literature. The finding in the
current study that mathematics related epistemological beliefs may be characterized by a
hierarchical factor structure appears to be supported in previous studies of mathematics
beliefs. Previous research indicates that students tend to believe mathematics knowledge
is static, that the goal of problem solving is to produce the right answer, that mathematics
knowledge is passively received from a teacher, and mathematics skill is either
something you have or you don’t (Kloosterman, 2002; Lerch, 2004; Mtetwa & Garofalo,
1989; Schoenfeld, 1989). Although these beliefs represent independent dimensions of
general beliefs (i.e. Certain Knowledge, Simple Knowledge, Omniscient Authority, and
Innate Ability), they appear to form a more coherent cluster of beliefs when focused
specifically on mathematics.
Two independent evaluations of research in mathematics beliefs concluded that an
important step in the advancement of the understanding of this construct is the
development of psychometrically sound instruments (DeCorte et al., 2002, Muis, 2004).
The current study represents an initial step in the process of producing a reliable and
valid measure of mathematics related epistemological beliefs. The ultimate focus of
research with both general and domain specific epistemological beliefs is to transform
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naïve beliefs into more sophisticated or availing beliefs. Constructivist curriculum and
learning environments are not well received when imposed on students with non-availing
beliefs. In order for teachers to embrace conceptual, integrated instruction and for
students to benefit from reform-based instruction, mathematics related epistemological
beliefs must be evaluated and addressed as part of classroom practice. Experimental
studies have shown that both achievement goals and implicit theories of intelligence are
subject to manipulation through intervention (Dweck, 2000). Empirical research is
needed to explore the effects of interventions aimed at influencing student beliefs.
Conclusions
Initial results seem to indicate that the EBSM is both a reliable and valid measure
of mathematics related beliefs. The EBSM characterized mathematics-related
epistemological beliefs as uni-dimensional based on factor analytic results. EBSM scores
were related in expected ways to mathematics experience, mathematics attitudes, and
math-based epistemological scenarios. Additionally, EBSM scores were related to
general epistemological beliefs and implicit theories of intelligence, while unrelated to
achievement goals.
The psychometric properties of the EBSM were superior to those of the EBI and
may indicate that students are able to respond in more consistent ways to domain specific
items. The result is a more consistent instrument in terms of structural and psychometric
properties. Some of the items on domain general instruments like the EBI may be too
general to elicit a consistent response on conceptually similar items leading to unstable
factor structure and low estimates of internal consistency reliability. Qian and Alverman
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(1995) noted that “modest internal consistency may be due to the nonconsensuality of the
construct underlying belief systems” (p. 290).
It appears that general and domain specific epistemological beliefs are related but
not redundant constructs. The present study supports a previous finding that students can
hold both domain specific and domain general beliefs simultaneously (Buehl et al.,
2002). The relationships among the EBSM, the AGI, and the TIS warrant further
analysis through structural equation modeling. The results presented indicate that
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APPENDIX A
EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS SURVEY FOR MATHEMATICS (EBSM)
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Epistemological Beliefs Survey for Mathematics (EBSM)
I. Source of Knowledge
1. Learning math depends most on having a good teacher.
2. I learn math best when watching the teacher work example problems.
3. I learn math best by working practice problems.
4. A teacher said, “I don’t really understand something until I teach it.” But
actually, teaching doesn’t help a teacher understand the material better, it
just reminds her of how much she already knows.
5. If math teachers gave really clear lectures with plenty of good example
problems, I wouldn’t have to practice so much on my own.
6. The quality of a math class is determined entirely by the instructor.
7. What I get from a math class depends mostly on the effort I invest.
8. Sometimes you have to accept answers from math teachers even if you
don’t understand them.
9. Math is something I could never learn on my own.
10. To solve math problems you have to be taught the right procedure.
11. In mathematics you can be creative and discover things on your own.
II. Certainty of Knowledge
1. Most of what is true in mathematics is already known.
2. Math is really just knowing the right formula for the problem.
3. I prefer a math teacher who shows students lots of different ways to look
at the same problem.
4. Mathematics is like a game that uses numbers, symbols and formulas.
5. Mathematical theories are the product of creativity.
6. There is usually one best way to solve a math problem.
7. In math, the answers are always either right or wrong.
8. Creativity has no place in a math class.
9. All mathematics professors would probably come up with the same
answers to questions in their field.
10. Truth is unchanging in mathematics.
11. Answers to questions in mathematics change as experts gather more
information.
III. Structure of Knowledge
1. It is important to know why something works rather than memorize a
formula
2. When learning math, I can understand the material better if I relate it to
the real world.
3. When solving problems, the key is knowing the best method for each type
of problem.
4. Math is mostly facts and procedures that have to be memorized.
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5. I learn best when the big picture is presented before the specific steps for
working a problem.
6. I like to find different ways to work problems.
7. I find it confusing when the teacher shows more than one way to work a
problem.
8. If there weren’t answers in the back of the book, I would have no idea
whether I had worked the problem correctly or not.
9. I don’t care about why something works, just show me how to work the
problem.
10. It is a waste of time to work on problems that have no solution.
11. Understanding how math is used in other disciplines helps me to
comprehend the concepts.
12. I often learn the most from my mistakes.
IV. Speed of Knowledge Acquisition
1. When it comes to math, most students either get it quickly or not at all.
2. It takes a lot of time to learn math.
3. If I can’t solve a problem quickly I get frustrated and tend to give up.
4. When I encounter a difficult math problem, I stick with it until I solve it.
5. Given enough time, almost everyone could learn algebra if they really
tried.
6. If you don’t understand something presented in class, going back over it
later isn’t going to help.
7. If you can’t solve a problem in a few minutes you’re not going to solve it
without help.
8. If you know what you’re doing, you shouldn’t have to spend more than a
few minutes to complete a homework problem.
9. It is frustrating to read a problem and not know immediately how to begin
to solve it.




1. When I’m having trouble in math class, better study habits can make a big
difference.
2. I’m confident I could learn calculus if I put in enough effort.
3. When I don’t understand something I keep asking questions.
4. Learning good study skills can improve my math ability.
5. Math is like a foreign language to me and even if I work hard I’ll never
really get it.
6. I knew at an early age what my math ability was.
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7. If math were easy for me, then I wouldn’t have to spend so much time on
homework.
8. It is frustrating when I have to work hard to understand a problem.
9. I can learn new things, but I can’t really change the math ability I was
born with.
10. I’m just not a math person.
General
11. Better study habits are the key to success for persons who struggle in
math.
12. Someone who doesn’t have high natural ability is still capable of learning
difficult material like calculus.
13. When you don’t understand something you should keep asking questions.
14. Learning good study skills can improve a person’s math ability.
15. Some people are born with great math ability and some aren’t.
16. Math ability is really just something you’re born with.
17. The smartest math students don’t have to do many problems because they
just get it.
18. It is frustrating for students to have to work hard to understand a problem.
19. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change the math ability you
were born with.
20. Most people know at an early age whether they are good at math or not.
VI. Real-world Applicability
1. I will rarely use algebra in real life.
2. Understanding mathematics is important for mathematicians, economists,
and scientists but not for most people.
3. The only reason I would take a math class is because it is a requirement.
4. I would rather work on real-life problems than those in the textbook.
5. I need to learn math for my future work.
6. I can apply what I learn in mathematics to other subjects.
7. It is easy to see the connections between the math I learn in class and real
world applications.
8. I’m rarely able to use the math I’ve learned in other subjects.
9. I will probably take more math than is required for my degree.
10. Mathematics provides the foundation for most of the principles used in
science and business.
11. Mathematics helps us better understand the world we live in.
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Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI, Schraw et al., 2002)
1. Most things worth knowing are easy to understand.
2. What is true is a matter of opinion.
3. Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.
4. People should always obey the law.
5. People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth.
6. Absolute moral truth does not exist.
7. Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life.
8. Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in school.
9. If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely end up
being confused.
10. Too many theories just complicate things.
11. The best ideas are often the most simple.
12. Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.
13. Some people are born with special gifts and talents.
14. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.
15. If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever learn it.
16. Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t.
17. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe.
18. If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them must be wrong.
19. Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority.
20. If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back over it
won’t help.
21. Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts.
22. The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know.
23. What is true today will be true tomorrow.
24. Smart people are born that way.
25. When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.
26. People shouldn’t question authority.
27. Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.
28. Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s big problems.
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Achievement Goal Inventory (Grant & Dweck, 2003)
1. It is very important to me to do well in my courses.
2. I really want to get good grades in my classes.
3. A major goal I have in my courses is to perform really well.
4. It is important to me to confirm my intelligence though my schoolwork.
5. In school I am focused on demonstrating my intellectual ability.
6. One of my important goals is to validate my intelligence through my schoolwork.
7. It is very important to me to do well in my courses compared to others.
8. I try to do better in my classes than other students.
9. A major goal I have in my courses is to get higher grades than the other students.
10. It is very important to me to confirm that I am more intelligent than other
students.
11. When I take a course in school it is very important for me to validate that I am
smarter than other students.
12. In school I am focused on demonstrating that I am smarter than other students.
13. I strive to constantly learn and improve in my courses.
14. In school I am always seeking opportunities to develop new skills and acquire
knowledge.
15. In my classes I focus on developing my abilities and acquiring new ones.
16. I seek out courses that I will find challenging.
17. I really enjoy facing challenges, and I seek out opportunities to do so in my
courses.
18. It is very important to me to feel that my coursework offers me real challenges.
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Theories of Intelligence Scale (Dweck, 2000)
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do much to
change it.
2. Your intelligence is something about you that can’t change very much.
3. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level.
4. To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are.
5. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are.
6. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence.
7. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit.
8. You can change even your basic intelligence level considerably.
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Edited Scenarios from the Epistemological
Beliefs Assessment for Physical Science (EBAPS, Elby, 2001)
Directions: In each of the following items you will read a short discussion between
two students who disagree about some issue. Then you’ll indicate whether you agree
with one student or the other.
1. Brandon: A good math textbook should show how the material in one chapter
relates to the material in other chapters. It shouldn’t treat each topic as a separate
unit because they’re not really separate.
Jamal: But most of the time, each chapter is about a different topic, and those
different topics don’t always have much to do with each other. The textbook
should keep everything separate, instead of blending it all together.
With whom do you agree? Read all the choices before circling one.
(a) I agree almost entirely with Brandon.
(b) Although I agree more with Brandon, I think Jamal makes some good points.
(c) I agree (or disagree) equally with Jamal and Brandon.
(d) Although I agree more with Jamal, I think Brandon makes some good points.
(e) I agree almost entirely with Jamal.
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2. Anna: I just read about Elizabeth Perry, the economist. She sounds naturally
brilliant.
Emily: Maybe she is. But when it comes to being a good at math, hard work is
more important than natural ability. I bet Dr. Perry does well because she has
worked really hard.
Anna: Well, maybe she did. But let’s face it, some people are just smarter at
math than other people. Without natural ability, hard work won’t get you
anywhere in math!
(a) I agree almost entirely with Anna.
(b) Although I agree more with Anna, I think Emily makes some good points.
(c) I agree (or disagree) equally with Anna and Emily.
(d) Although I agree more with Emily, I think Anna makes some good points.
(e) I agree almost entirely with Emily.
3. Jessica and Mia are working on a homework assignment together. . .
Jessica: O.K., we just got problem #1. I think we should go on to problem #2.
Mia: No, wait. I don’t really understand how we got that answer.
Jessica: Mia, we know it’s the right answer from the back of the book, so what
are you worried about? If we didn’t understand it, we wouldn’t have gotten the
right answer.
Mia: No, I think it’s possible to get the right answer without really understanding
what it means.
(a) I agree almost entirely with Jessica
(b) Although I agree more with Jessica, I think Mia makes some good points.
(c) I agree (or disagree) equally with Mia and Jessica.
(d) Although I agree more with Mia, I think Jessica makes some good points.









ETHNICITY (check one): _____ Hispanic _____ African American or black
_____ Native American _____ White
_____ Asian American _____ Multi Ethnic/Racial
_____ Other
What math courses have you have completed in high school and/or college?
(check all that apply)
_____Algebra I or Elementary Algebra








Are you an international student? (circle one): yes no





What is your College Major: ____________________________
What is your Career Goal: ____________________________
Which statements best describe your experiences in mathematics (Check all that apply):
_____ Math has always been easy for me.
_____ Math is one of my favorite subjects.
_____ Math is not my favorite subject but I don’t hate it.
_____ Math isn’t easy for me. I have to work really hard to learn math.
_____ I have never had good experiences in a math class.







I am conducting a study to examine student beliefs about learning. The responses
you provide will help educators better understand student’s beliefs about knowledge and
learning. If you choose to participate in this study you will be asked to complete a
questionnaire that asks to what degree you agree or disagree with a number of statements
about beliefs specific to learning mathematics, general beliefs about knowledge and
learning, beliefs about intelligence, and motivation.
Participation is strictly voluntary. If you choose not to participate or withdraw
from the study at any time, there will be no penalty. The answers you provide are strictly
confidential and no identifying information will be collected. It is estimated that the
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